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Religious freedom is a fundamental value in American
constitutional law. Thomas Jefferson called it "the most inalienable and
sacred of all human rights."' James Madison urged that religion "must
be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right
of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its
nature an unalienable right."2 The First Amendment contains a separate
clause addressing the free exercise and nonestablishment of religion, thus
distinguishing religious freedom from freedoms of speech, press,
assembly, and petition.3 The question is, why? Why does the First
Amendment single out religion for special protection in our
constitutional system? Why is religion treated differently than other
beliefs and activities? What, if anything, about religion merits unique
constitutional rules? 4
These questions largely have been ignored in our thinking about the
First Amendment's Religion Clause. Courts and commentators have
been preoccupied instead with mechanical tests, misleading metaphors,
and simplistic attempts to reduce the Religion Clause guarantees to a
1. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia (Oct. 7,
1822), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON, CONTAINING His MAJOR WRITINGS 957-58 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1969).
2. JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS 1 (June 20, 1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Learner eds., 1987).
3. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED To
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 91
(1990) ("The Founders granted religion a special status in the Constitution. This status
derived from a conviction that religious exercise, as opposed to other personal and social
forces, needed and deserved unique treatment.").
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single principle, such as neutrality, separation, accommodation, or
equality. Beyond the understanding that there should be no official state
church or single favored religion, few are able to agree on what the
Religion Clause means. Some question whether the no-establishment
provision should apply to the states at all,5 others suggest that the
Supreme Court has all but eviscerated the free exercise provision, 6 while
still others claim that the First Amendment offers no unique protections
for religious freedom beyond those inherent in fundamental principles of
autonomy and equality.7 Religion Clause interpretation has become
largely a matter of political ideology and personal viewpoint; how the
clause is construed often depends on the interpreter's personal reasons
for being favorably or unfavorably disposed toward religion itself.8 We
are left with a Religion Clause jurisprudence that lacks the clarity,
coherence, and continuity that we normally expect from constitutional
standards. Conflicting and confusing precedents also have made it
almost impossible to explain the Religion Clause to ordinary citizens.
The meaning of this cherished freedom is practically lost to the wide
array of people who benefit most from its protections.
To be sure, our constitutional commitment to religious freedom
poses questions that cannot easily be answered. The Religion Clause
itself is written in broad terms, the meaning of which is not immediately
obvious. Religion Clause disputes frequently cross constitutional
boundaries and include free speech, equality, and state action issues.
Resolving competing interests typically has been left to multi-factor
balancing tests, which are inherently subjective, value-laden, and
5. See, e.g., AKIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 246-54 (1998); Steven D. Smith, The
Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843
(2006); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that "while the Federal Government may 'make no law respecting
an establishment of religion,' the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious
matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual
religious liberty interest").
6. This is a common reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that the free exercise provision does
not require exemptions from generally-applicable laws that burden the practice of
religion. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Should the Religion Clauses Be Amended?, 32 Lov.
L.A. L. REV. 9, 17 (1998) (coming "to the disconcerting conclusion that the Supreme
Court has nearly written the Free Exercise Clause out of the Constitution").
7. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007); Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special
Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 571; Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST.
COMMENT., Winter 2008 (forthcoming), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1012910.
8. See Carl Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary
American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 375 (arguing that a person's view of
church-state relations usually derives that person's own theological or philosophical
worldview).
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indeterminate. These interpretive issues are made more difficult by the
growing religious diversity of our society and by an increasing fixation
among legal elites on a concept of formal equality that tends to diminish
the unique constitutional status of religious freedom.
Part of the problem is that we are not quite sure what the Religion
Clause protects. If religion is nothing more than "transcendental
moonshine" 9 or silly superstition-on the same level as fortune telling or
believing in ghosts-it makes little sense to constitutionalize its
protection.10 The fact that we have a Religion Clause suggests that
religion is something more than foolishness, but what? Until we
consider carefully what makes religion distinctive and worth protecting,
we will never understand why we protect religious freedom or why we
have a Religion Clause.
I. THESIS: REDISCOVERING THE RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
We should not be surprised to learn that the original reasons for
singling out religion and placing it beyond government's power were
mostly religious." The First Amendment did not conceive religious
freedom; rather, it adopted and incorporated the widely-recognized
natural and inalienable right of each person to worship God according to
his or her own conviction and conscience.12  This right to religious
9. Ellis Sandoz, Religious Liberty and Religion in the American Founding
Revisited, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 245, 251 (Noel B. Reynolds and
W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 1996).
10. Michael Paulsen uses the ghost analogy when criticizing modem secular
attitudes toward the First Amendment's special treatment of religion. He writes, "It is
embarrassing to the skeptical, rationalist, nonreligious or irreligious mind, to think that
the Constitution might single out religion for special protection, and perhaps even
preferred treatment ... and do so because the Framers believed in God. It would be like
learning that the Constitution contained a provision providing for the protection of
ghosts." Michael Stokes Paulsen, God is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of
Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1597, 1612 (1997) (book review).
11. I am indebted to Michael McConnell for first calling my attention to this fact and
stirring my curiosity to investigate it further. Judge McConnell has made the point in
several writings. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2000); Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the
"First Freedom "?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1245-57 (2000); Michael W. McConnell,
"God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!: Religious Freedom in the Post-Modern Age,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 163, 167-72; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1437-41, 1496-99
(1990). Steven Smith's seminal article discussing the underlying justifications for
religious freedom also helped shape my early thinking on this matter. See Steven D.
Smith, The Rise and Fall ofFreedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149
(1991).
12. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, for example, declared that "[a]mong
the natural rights, some are in their very nature unalienable, because no equivalent can be
488 [Vol. 114:2
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freedom rested upon theological foundations, and a proper understanding
of these foundations will help define and clarify the contours of the right
as it is protected by the First Amendment. John Witte puts it succinctly
when he writes that an "acknowledgement of the theological pedigree of
the First Amendment is an instance of constitutional correction, not
'religious correctness."' 1 3 He suggests:
We cannot hold up as normative those eighteenth-century texts that
happen to anticipate contemporary secular fashions and deprecate
others that do not have modem forms. We cannot pretend that the
First Amendment is a purely secular trope, or just another category of
liberty and autonomy, and expect citizens to believe in it.... The
First Amendment, in both its formation and its enforcement, is
predicated in part on theological visions and values. It has to be. To
insist that it is merely a neutral instrument, bleached of all religious
qualities, only invites secular prejudices to become constitutional
prerogatives. 1
This is not to deny the influence of nonreligious justifications for
the Religion Clause. Some advocates for religious freedom during the
founding period made their arguments purely on secular grounds; others,
such as James Madison, used both religious and nonreligious arguments.
But, as leading church-state historian Thomas Curry emphasizes, "it was
the American religious and evangelical background of religious liberty
that made the American experience of it unique.""
The colonial and founding generations took seriously the unique
character and claims of religion. For the most part, those who
participated in constitutional achievement of religious freedom were
themselves deeply religious persons: their worldview was Christian and
their arguments and audience were almost exclusively Christian.'6 They
believed that religion is unique because it entails duties owed to God.
Their principal justifications for religious freedom rested upon the
given or received for them. Of this kind are the rights of conscience." N.H. CONST. Pt. I,
art. IV, (1784), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 81.
Several other state constitutions during the founding period recognized religious freedom
as a "natural and unalienable" right. See id. at 70-71, 75 (quoting from the Delaware,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont constitutions).
13. JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
xxiii (2d ed. 2005) (citing ISAAC KRAMNICK AND R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996)).
14. Id.
15. THOMAS J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRISTENDOM: THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA 73 n.1 (2001).
16. See Smith, supra note 11, at 157-58 ("[E]ven those Americans like Jefferson,
who departed from Protestant orthodoxy under the influence of the Enlightenment and
who were accordingly sometimes regarded by their more pious contemporaries as
'infidels' or even 'atheists,' viewed the world in strongly religious terms.").
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theological premise that God exists and is sovereign over both human
government and the individual citizen. The most striking presentation of
this argument is found in James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments:
[The right of religious conscience] is unalienable . . . because what is
here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty
of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as
he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in
order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he
must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe:
And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate
Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to the
General Authority; much more must every man who becomes a
member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his
allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.17
For Madison and others, religious obligations were paramount.
Defining the proper relation between religion and civil government
meant drawing a jurisdictional boundary between two potentially
competing authorities, one spiritual and the other political. That line was
drawn with the understanding that duty to God, as perceived within the
individual conscience, is superior to political, legal, or social obligations.
Religion thus posited an ultimate limit on the power of the state. In this
sense, the First Amendment was intended to function as a sort of
religious "supremacy clause" which presumes that God exists and makes
claims on human beings and that those claims are first in both time and
importance to the claims of the state.
Also underlying the early commitment to religious freedom was the
perception that this higher call of God makes the exercise of religious
faith a uniquely transcendent and intimate human activity, distinct from
other human interests or pursuits. For religious devotion to be authentic,
it must be a voluntary matter between the individual and God. The state
neither is competent to define the "correct" relation between that person
and God, nor may it legitimately use its power to direct or force
individual devotion to God. Thus, religion must be treated differently-
it should be let alone, regardless of whether other human activities and
institutions are let alone, except when religious exercise obviously
17. MADISON, supra note 2, at 82. The Supreme Court has relied on the Memorial
and Remonstrance for insight into the founders' intent for the Religion Clause. See, e.g.,
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1 1-13 (1947).
490 [Vol. 114:2
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endangers either the state's existence or the basic rights of another
person. 18
Modem Religion Clause jurisprudence lacks the resonance of our
eighteenth-century commitment to religious freedom. It reflects instead
a growing indifference, incomprehension, and even contempt toward
religion. The religious justifications for religious freedom have all but
disappeared from the law, leaving only the once-supplementary secular
justifications rooted in skepticism and expediency. Religion no longer is
seen as a higher duty, but merely a matter of personal autonomy-and
the law is increasingly reluctant to distinguish religious choices from
secular choices. The task of defining our concept of religious freedom
largely has been left to those who doubt the claims of religion or
discount the religious commitments of others. Such an impoverished
view of religion inevitably distorts our legal and political discourse about
religious freedom. It is hard to take religious freedom seriously when
you don't take religion seriously.' 9 To borrow Mark Tushnet's words
from another context, "[t]he jurisprudence of the religion clauses is a
mess not because we do not understand the Constitution, but because we
do not understand religion." 2 0
My thesis is that the First Amendment's protection of religious
freedom must rest preeminently on the intrinsic character and claims of
religion itself. Religion requires special constitutional treatment
precisely because it involves something transcendent, objective,
normative, and exclusive. To sustain a vigorous commitment to religious
freedom, we must revisit and recover the original religious justifications
for religious freedom. (I will refer to these justifications collectively as
the theological or religious argument for religious freedom.). The
religious justifications provide a powerful yet often ignored explanation
for why religious freedom is worth protecting.
That explanation begins with the idea that God exists beyond the
state. It provides a rationale for religious freedom that is rooted in the
nature of God and of genuine devotion to God. The reality of God, as we
18. For example, Madison proposed a religion clause to the Virginia Declaration of
Rights which said that religion should not be subjected to state control unless "the
preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered." 1
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 177 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal
eds., 1962).
19. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 15 (1965)
("Though it would be possible ... that men who were deeply skeptical in religious
matters should demand a constitutional prohibition against abridgments of religious
liberty, surely it is more probable that the demand should come from those who
themselves were believers.").
20. Mark Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 997, 1008-09 (1986).
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shall see, was an essential premise underlying the arguments for religious
freedom during the colonial and founding periods. Proponents
understood what they were protecting, and their arguments were both
profound and accessible. Religious freedom only made sense because
God exists: God makes claims on human beings; these claims are prior
to and superior to the claims of the state; the individual's response to
God's claims, to be genuine, must be voluntary and not coerced; the state
must not attempt to define or regulate the relationship between God and
the individual and ordinarily must yield to the claims of God as
articulated by the sincere believer. The theological argument for
religious freedom did not depend on the subjective value of religion to
the individual or the objective importance of religion as a public good;
rather, it ultimately is based on the plausibility of the essential claim of
religion, namely, that God exists. 21
This premise is controversial, of course. The reality of God is what
separates religion from rationalism, humanism, skepticism, secularism,
postmodemism, or any other way of looking at the world. And it is what
at once gives the religious justifications for religious freedom their
peculiar force and controversial character. The modem secularist
typically is bothered by such "God talk" and insists on deconstructing it
before exploring the reasons behind the First Amendment's protection of
religious freedom. The modem religionist also may object that the
concept of religion no longer requires a belief in the existence of God,
but instead has been "broadened" to include nontheistic conceptions of
spirituality. It remains to be seen whether constitutional discourse today,
infused with such secular and nontheistic notions, still can engage with
an earlier discourse which assumed the existence of a Supreme Being.
To the extent we perceive religion as irrelevant or indistinct, we distance
ourselves from the very reasons that brought us the Religion Clause.
Without a concept of God, it may be impossible to have a concept
of religious freedom that singles out religion for special protections not
21. Some who argue for the special protection of religion because of its unique
characteristics emphasize how meaningful religious faith is to the individual or how
valuable religion is to society. See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 13, at 250 (arguing that
religion is special, in part, because it is a "unique source of individual and personal
identity" as well as a "unique form of public and social identity"); see generally JOHN
GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996); Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and
Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303 (2001); Laura S. Underkuffler-
Freund, Yoder and the Question of Equality, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 789 (1996). Religion is
special, in their view, because religion represents a unique human aspiration or endeavor
or because religion benefits culture (good works, stability, etc.), irrespective of whether
its claims are true. By contrast, my thesis is that religious freedom makes sense because
of the plausibility (i.e., apparent warrant) of God's existence. If there is no God, then
religious freedom ultimately is incoherent, and religious faith and practice should be
treated no differently than other human ideas and activities.
492 [Vol. 114:2
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afforded other human endeavors. If the modem liberal state can protect
only subjective, inclusive, autonomous religion-i.e., a "godless" or
"irreligious" religion-then why protect religion at all? Once God is
removed from religion, then religion amounts to nothing more than
individual fancies and tastes. Why protect idiosyncrasies? The
achievement of religious freedom in the West derived from Christian
principles, most notably, the ideas that civil government has no
jurisdiction over spiritual matters and that it is not in the nature or will of
God to coerce authentic religious belief. If we are incapable of speaking
as if God exists and religion is unique, then the meaning and power of
the founding generation's most powerful arguments for religious
freedom will remain beyond us. For our constitutional commitment to
religious freedom to remain viable, we are going to have to make peace
with its theological foundations.22
This is the first in a trilogy of articles that examine the justifications
on religious grounds for religion's special status in the First Amendment.
My purpose is to clarify something of the theological argument's
theoretical and historical origins, to show its prevalence during
America's colonial and founding periods, and to explain why it must
provide the principal intellectual and rhetorical underpinnings of modern
Religion Clause jurisprudence. The first article, published here, sketches
the emergence, loss, and recovery of the religious justifications for
toleration in Western thought.2 3 Two future articles will complete the
series: the second will trace the influence of the religious justifications in
developing America's constitutional commitment to religious freedom;
the third will examine the weaknesses of modern secular justifications
22. Brian Leiter, for example, argues that there is no credible principled reason for
tolerating religion as religion or for according special treatment to religious practices.
See generally Leiter, supra note 7. Leiter's points are well taken, so long as you agree
with his concept of religion, which lacks any meaningful notion of a transcendent God.
While Leiter considers the "categoricity of religious commands" and, more briefly, what
he calls the "metaphysics of ultimate reality," his view of religion ultimately is
subjective, temporal, and irrational-for him, ultimate reality is not God, but only what is
most important in making human lives worthwhile and meaningful. The religion Leiter
considers is much closer to the Kantian concept that God is only an apprehension innate
to the human mind (Kant: "God is not a being outside me, but merely a thought in me")
than to the religion that historically was thought to deserve special constitutional
protection.
23. By identifying religious freedom as a distinctively Western and Christian
concept, I am not saying that only those in the Christian West desire and value it, or that
only those in the Christian West are capable of achieving it. Religious arguments for
toleration can be made from within other religious traditions, but I will leave that to those
more familiar with such traditions. Whether other religious traditions are capable of
providing cogent justifications for religious freedom is an open question. Christianity
may be unique in that it can offer compelling reasons for respecting religious conscience
without compromising its essential truth claims.
4932009]
HeinOnline  -- 114 Penn St. L. Rev. 493 2009-2010
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
for religious freedom and argue for recovering the religious justifications
as the best defense for a Religion Clause jurisprudence threatened by
both religious majoritarianism and skeptical secularism.
The historical narrative that follows seeks to fill critical gaps in our
understanding of why religious freedom is a fundamental American
value. The events surrounding the struggle for religious freedom in
America and the ratification of the First Amendment have been broadly
covered by modern legal scholarship. Insufficient attention has been
given to the rationales for religious toleration that emerged from
sixteenth and seventeenth century England and Europe, which formed
the historical context and theoretical foundation for the American
achievement of religious freedom. That achievement is the offspring of
the bitter struggle against persecution and the fierce intellectual
controversies that arose out the divisions created by the Protestant
Reformation. Legal scholarship also has overlooked the fact that the
ideas which ended the dominance of the persecuting state had their real
beginning in the third and fourth centuries, when early Christians
produced powerful justifications for religious toleration and freedom that
were theological in nature and appeal. Sixteenth and seventeenth century
advocates rediscovered these justifications and made them the
centerpiece of their intellectual offensive against state-imposed religious
uniformity. Revisiting this history will help us better understand the
predominant role the theological argument played in freeing spiritual
matters from the state's jurisdiction, moving political authority beyond
mere toleration to full religious freedom, and overcoming longstanding
religious counterarguments.
This article is not intended to provide an inquiry into the
institutional details of church-state relations or a chronology of the
development of religious freedom from classical antiquity. Rather, it is
an historical overview of the emergence and development of the
predominant ideas that explain why we have religious freedom. Along
the way, I refer the reader to the works of other scholars that provide a
comprehensive examination of the historical details and chronology. The
account that follows is instrumental to the larger purpose of illuminating
these ideas and their political consequences.24
24. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 427-28 (2002) (arguing that any theory of constitutional
interpretation must take seriously the lessons of intellectual history, as distinguished from
institutional or legal history).
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II. THE ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN EARLY CHRISTIAN
THOUGHT
Religious freedom is regarded as one of our basic and most precious
rights and an essential attribute of a free society. But how and where did
the concept originate? Many Americans would look for the answer to
this question in the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and
in the First Amendment's prohibition against religious establishments
and protection of free exercise of religion. The founders' ideas on the
subject were largely derivative, however, having been influenced by
tolerationist thinking in early modem England and Europe. A massive
body of writings appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that
presented an array of arguments favoring religious toleration, liberty of
conscience, and disestablishment. These arguments were made mostly
by Christian thinkers, who were motivated by their religious beliefs to
oppose both Catholic and Protestant regimes of persecution. But even
their ideas had deeper roots. The rationale for religious toleration and
freedom had its real beginning in the third and fourth centuries, when
earlier Christian thinkers opposed state coercion of religious uniformity
based on the nature of God and of authentic belief. Their writings
provided the first principled justification for religious toleration that went
beyond political expediency. While other justifications, both theoretical
and pragmatic, have been advanced to support religious freedom, the
theological argument has been the dominant principled response to
religious intolerance and persecution.
Our constitutional commitment to religious freedom is the
culmination of centuries of theological and political controversy about
the proper relation between religion and government. Religious freedom
advocates sought to protect authentic devotion to God and to distance
religious congregations from the corrupting influence of civil power.
Those who opposed religious toleration, on the other hand, were deeply
concerned about social order and unity. They believed that neither
religion nor the state would survive and prosper without a close alliance
between the two. For us, the resolution of this conflict was manifest in
the adoption of the Religion Clause of the First Amendment. The
remarkable feature of the American achievement of religious freedom is
that it created a stable system of government in which both religion and
religious freedom can flourish.
A. Early Christian Views on Religious Toleration and Freedom
Tension between church and state was inevitable from the very
beginnings of the Christian religion. Unlike the Hebrew theocracy, in
2009]1 495
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which the civil and ecclesiastical were merged into a single institution
and God was the constitutional source of all authority over things secular
and things religious, early Christianity taught that civil governments,
while established by and subject to God, have no jurisdiction over
25
spiritual matters. Unlike Islam, in which religious and political
institutions arose interdependently, early Christianity emerged from a
culture with its own established government and politics based on non-
Christian ideas.26 From the outset, there was always the possibility that
Christian believers would be faced with conflicting obligations as they
lived under two sovereigns.
1. Early Christian Teaching on Church and State
Early Christian teaching distinguished between the claims of God
and the claims of the state. Jesus taught his followers to "give to Caesar
what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's." 27 Christian believers thus
were to fulfill their obligations, to the fullest extent possible, to both God
and the state. But by this Jesus also indicated that there are limits to the
jurisdiction of earthly rulers. Caesar's image is on those things necessary
to the proper function of civil society; therefore, civil government
legitimately exerts power over this realm. But the state has no right to
regulate what God has put his image on-those things which belong to
God as Creator, Redeemer, and Sovereign. And since human beings bear
the imageo Deo, their allegiance to God takes precedence over their
allegiance to the state. Jesus also emphasized the deliberate nature of
genuine faith. He taught that the "first and greatest commandment" is to
"[1]ove the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and
with all your mind." 28 Not only must devotion to God come before all
other commitments, but implicit in this command is the idea that such
devotion must be voluntary, not coerced. Love for God is not genuine
unless it comes willingly and fully from the inner person; forced love is
an impossibility.
The apostle Paul taught that civil authorities must be obeyed
because they are established by God and are God's servants.2 9
25. See SANFORD COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 20-21 (photo.
reprint 1968) (1902).
26. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH & STATE 1050-1300, at 7 (Medieval
Academy of America 1988) (1964).
27. Luke 20:25.
28. Matthew 22:37-38.
29. Romans 13:1-7. The teaching that civil governments are established by God
does not mean that civil governments are intrinsically good. Christian doctrine teaches
that human beings are naturally corrupt and fallen, all too willing to do wrong. This
condition is exacerbated by the possession of civil power. Nevertheless, the early
Christians believed that God remains sovereign over human government. Civil rulers
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Submission is necessary not just because of the threat of punishment, but
also "because of conscience."3 0 While civil authorities are agents of
God, they cannot lay claim to the absolute authority that belongs to God.
Their power is limited and there are matters beyond their jurisdiction and
control.3 Similarly, the apostle Peter taught that Christians are to "fear
God" and "honor the King." 32 They are to do both, whenever possible.
Yet Peter recognized that civil authorities cannot exercise ultimate power
over spiritual matters. When faced with conflicting commands from God
and earthly leaders, Peter declared: "We must obey God rather than
men!"33
Early Christian teaching thus drew a rudimentary distinction
between religion and the state that is essentially jurisdictional. The
starting point is that there are two sovereigns with distinct spheres of
authority. God is sovereign over all and the believer owes God his
ultimate allegiance. The civil magistrate's jurisdiction has been
established by God and is limited to matters properly delegated to the
realm of human government. Believers are to obey both God and civil
authorities; when that is not possible, the commands of God take
precedence over the commands of the state. The jurisdictional
boundaries delineated by Jesus and the apostles were given to help
individual believers understand what to do when faced with conflicting
commands from God and the state. They were not part of a political
model of church-state relations, nor were they given primarily to instruct
civil rulers about the limits of their authority over religious believers.
They nevertheless provide the basis for future understandings about the
proper relationship between religious and civil authority.
Early Christian teaching also emphasized the voluntariness of
genuine religious devotion. There was no sanction in early Christian
doctrine or example for forced imposition of religious orthodoxy. Christ
came to establish a new kingdom-one not spread through force or
violence, but rather by persuasion and example.34 He urged his followers
to love their enemies, turn the other cheek, and do unto others as they
would have done to themselves. Christians were taught that since they
are recipients of God's kindness, tolerance, and forgiveness, they ought
to show patience and mercy toward others.36 As John Locke later
may act for evil or selfish reasons of their own, but God's purposes ultimately will
prevail.
30. Romans 13:5.
31. Romans 13:7.
32. 1Peter 2:17.
33. Acts 5:29; see Acts 4:18-20.
34. Matthew 28:19-20; 2 Timothy 2: 24-25.
35. Matthew 5-7.
36. Romans 2:4; Matthew 18:21-35.
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observed, "the Gospel frequently declares, that the true disciples of
Christ must suffer persecution; but that the church of Christ should
persecute others, and force others by fire and sword, to embrace her faith
and doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the books of the New
Testament."n Although doctrinal unity is valued, the New Testament
never sanctions coercion or silencing of those who embrace heresies or
cause divisions. 39 The remedy for dealing with heresy and schism is first
to admonish the offender and then, if that is unsuccessful, to reject and
avoid him, which typically means expulsion from the Christian church
and community.40 Exclusion and avoidance are the harshest penalties
authorized; there is no provision for the infliction of physical or civil
punishment on religious dissenters.
These teachings provided the elements that might be constructed
into a theology of religious freedom. The idea that temporal rulers do
not have jurisdiction over spiritual matters was radical. The English
historian Lord Acton wrote that "the vice of the classic State was that it
was both Church and State in one. Morality was undistinguished from
religion and politics from morals; and in religion, morality, and politics
there was only one legislator and one authority."4 1 Tierney observes that
the most common form of human government has been some form of
theocratic absolutism: "The Pharaohs of Egypt, the Incas of Peru, the
emperors of Japan were all revered as divine figures. The order of
society was seen as a part of the divine order of the cosmos; the ruler
provided a necessary link between heaven and earth."42 He adds that
"[t]ypically, in such societies, religious liberty was neither conceived of
nor desired."4 3 By contrast, as John Noonan explains, early Christian
teaching contained the fundamental concepts of religious freedom:
By the first century A.D. there is in the Mediterranean world a
religion, which will spread widely in the West, that carries the
concepts of a God, living, distinct from and superior to any human
being, society, or state; of obligations to that God, distinct from and
37. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 25 (Prometheus Books 1990)
(1689).
38. See, e.g., Romans 16:17; 1 Corinthians 1:10.
39. For an extended discussion of this point, see PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOW THE IDEA OF
RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CAME TO THE WEST 17-21 (2003).
40. See, e.g., Titus 3:10 ("Warn a divisive person once, and then warn him a second
time. After that, have nothing to do with him.").
41. John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, An Address to the Members of the
Bridgnorth Institution at Agricultural Hall on the History of Freedom in Antiquity (Feb.
26, 1877), in THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 16-17 (John Neville Figgis
& Reginald Vere Laurence eds., 1907).
42. Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
IN WESTERN THOUGHT, supra note 9, at 34.
43. Id.
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superior to any society or state; of authorized teachers who can voice
these obligations and judge any society or state; of an inner voice of
reason that is one way God speaks as well as by His authorized
teachers. According to these concepts as taught by this religion, each
person, individually and not as part of a family, tribe, or nation, will
have to account to God as Judge for every thought and deed.
Collectively, these concepts are at the core of liberty of conscience
and liberty of religion.44
That God exists is a necessary premise to the argument for religious
freedom. Without God, there is no higher sovereign, no superior duty,
and no individual accountability.
2. Persecution in the Early Roman Empire
The principles taught by Jesus and the apostles provided clarity for
early Christians who at times found themselves persecuted by the Roman
state for refusing to engage in state-mandated emperor worship. Such
persecution was sporadic in the beginning, became more systematic with
the edict of Decius in A.D. 250, and reached its peak during the reign of
Diocletian in 284-305. Christians suffered confiscation of property,
imprisonment, torture, and even execution. Their immediate concern
was dealing with persecution, not constructing a theory of church-state
relations-that question does not assume practical importance until the
fourth century. As the Jesuit historian John Rohr points out, "[t]he
Church of the catacombs was too busy staying out of the way of the
government to indulge in the luxury of speculating on the niceties of
sacred and secular jurisdiction."4 5
Although Roman persecution of Christianity and other illegal
religions was infrequent in the first two centuries, it was not because
official policy required religious toleration. The word for "toleration"
comes from the Latin verb tolerare, which means "to bear or endure,"
and indicates a "grudging and temporary acceptance of an unpleasant
necessity."46  Richard Vernon suggests that "[t]oleration involves the
reluctant acceptance of things that one hates or despises."4 7 Perhaps the
44. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 44-45 (1998).
45. John A. Rohr, Religious Toleration in St. Augustine, 9 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 51,
66 (1967). For a helpful discussion of persecution and toleration in the first four
centuries, see W.H.C. FREND, MARTYRDOM AND PERSECUTION IN THE EARLY CHURCH: A
STUDY OF CONFLICT FROM THE MACCABEES To DONATUS (1965).
46. Randolph C. Head, Introduction: The Transformations of the Long Sixteenth
Century, in BEYOND THE PERSECUTING SOCIETY: RELIGIOUS TOLERATION BEFORE THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 95, 97 (John Christian Laursen & Cary J. Nederman eds., 1998).
47. RICHARD VERNON, THE CAREER OF TOLERATION: JOHN LOCKE, JONAS PROAST,
AND AFTER 71 (1997).
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best definition comes from Peter Gamsey, a leading historian of classical
antiquity, who says that toleration is "disapproval or disagreement
coupled with an unwillingness to take action against those who are
viewed with disfavour in the interest of some moral or political principle.
It is an active concept, not to be confused with indifference, apathy or
passive acquiescence."48 Thus, those who tolerate disagree with what
they are tolerating, yet because of some principle choose to exercise
restraint towards it. Rome often appeared tolerant either because its
polytheism absorbed other gods or because it lacked the will or resources
to engage in systematic persecution, but such elasticity or hesitancy is
not toleration under Garnsey's definition. 4 9 No Roman emperor or jurist
in the first two centuries articulated a moral or political principle that
accounted for the Roman government's forbearance during this period.o
Historian Perez Zagorin explains that
[a]t nearly all stages of their history the Romans were willing to
accept foreign cults and practices; this de facto religious pluralism is
entirely attributable to the polytheistic character of Roman religion
and had nothing to do with principles or values sanctioning religious
toleration, a concept unknown to Roman society or law and never
debated by Roman philosophers or political writers.51
A principled defense for religious toleration did not appear until the
writings of Christian thinkers near the end of the second century.
Rome's religious pluralism no longer extended to Christianity after
the second century. The turning point was Caracalla's edict issued in
212, which granted Roman citizenship to all the empire's free inhabitants
and required them, as part of their obligations of citizenship, to show
loyalty to the Roman deities.5 2 This resulted in the demise of de facto
toleration and religious pluralism that previously existed under various
local authorities. Historian Elizabeth Digeser explains that "[i]n the
early empire, religious pluralism survived in the interstices between
peregrine and Roman law. But after the passage of the Antonine
Constitution, Decius, Valerian, and Diocletian were quite willing to use
48. Peter Garnsey, Religious Toleration in Classical Antiquity, in PERSECUTION AND
TOLERATION I (W.J. Shiels, ed., 1984) (citing B. Crick, Toleration and Tolerance in
Theory and Practice, in 6 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION: A JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE
POLITICS 143, 144-71 (1971)).
49. ELIZABETH DEPALMA DIGESER, THE MAKING OF A CHRISTIAN EMPIRE:
LACTANTIUS AND ROME 119 (2000).
50. Id.
51. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 4. On the absence of a principled concept of
toleration in Roman society, see also Gamsey, supra note 48, at 9-12.
52. DIGESER, supra note 49, at 50-51.
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force against groups whose refusal to worship the gods called into
question their loyalty to the laws."s3
Caracalla's edict had profound consequences for Christians. Very
few Christians had been citizens before 212, but Caracalla's edict made
them citizens and therefore obligated them to pay homage to the Roman
gods.54 After the edict, loyalty to the Roman state was demonstrated not
merely by denying the Christian faith, but by participation in the Roman
imperial cult." Christians were considered treasonous because,
following the teachings of Jesus, their first allegiance was to God, not
Caesar. Christians thus suffered because they refused to recognize the
supremacy of the state over their religious practices. As Peter Garnsey
explains: "The claim that theirs was the one true religion, their active
proselytism and their obstinate refusal to participate in the imperial cult
meant that Christians were always vulnerable to the charge of disloyalty
to the emperor and state."s6
The appeal to Rome for toleration originated not with secular
philosophers, but with Christian thinkers. No arguments for religious
toleration or religious freedom appear in the pagan (secular) literature of
the first three centuries. 57  Perhaps this was because advocacy of
toleration was tantamount to advocacy of treason. Digeser suggests that
"[t]he intimate connection between loyalty to the gods and to the laws
which was the hallmark of Roman citizenship explains . . . the absence of
any theoretical statement endorsing toleration in the extant philosophical
or imperial literature of Rome before the fourth century."5 s Near the end
of the second century, Christian advocates for religious toleration first
urged that state-enforced religion is incompatible with basic assumptions
about God and religious faith. Justin Martyr, for example, wrote that
"nothing is more contrary to religion than constraint"59 and "compulsion
is not an attribute of God."6 0 He suggested that God is more interested in
the inward purity and sincere obedience than in correct religious ritual.6 1
53. Id. at 119-20.
54. Id. at 50-51.
55. J.B. RIVES, RELIGION AND AUTHORITY IN ROMAN CARTHAGE: FROM AUGUSTUS
To CONSTANTINE 252 (1995).
56. Garnsey, supra note 48, at 10.
57. See id. at 9-12.
58. DIGESER, supra note 49, at 52 (footnote omitted).
59. M. SEARLE BATES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN INQUIRY 137 (1945) (quoting Justin
Martyr).
60. Justin Martyr, Letter to Diognetus 7, in FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A
SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 14 (Oliver O'Donovan & Joan
Lockwood O'Donovan eds. 1999) (translation by Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classical Library
(1913)) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT].
61. Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho ch. 12, 14, in 6 THE FATHERS OF THE
CHURCH 165-66, 168-70 (Thomas B. Falls trans., 1948).
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The task of giving these ideas their theoretical underpinnings was taken
up by Tertullian and Lactantius.
3. Tertullian's Call for Religious Freedom
Tertullian, a rhetorician, lawyer, and leading Christian theologian of
the late second and third century, broke new ground in the struggle
against Roman persecution. He asserted that it is a "fundamental human
right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to
his own convictions."6 2 He was the first to argue for religious toleration
as a general principle and, in so doing, coined the phrase "freedom of
religion" (libertas religionis). His concept of religious freedom
included both relief from state persecution and coercion as well as the
right of dissenters to worship when, where, and who they wished, but it
did not include the modem idea of disestablishment. Tertullian's
religious freedom, as Peter Garnsey points out, is an individual right, not
just the right of an ethnos or polis. 64 Gamsey attributes the origin of this
idea to the writings of Paul the apostle, who stressed "the tension ...
between the authority of individual conscience and the wisdom of the
Christian community." 6 5  The emphasis on individual conscience,
Gamsey explains, is "a breakthrough that only a Christian could make,
because the Christian, notoriously, had abandoned his ancestral tradition
and embraced a supranational universal religion."6 6
Tertullian offered a theological rationale for religious freedom in his
Apology, when he wrote that the basis for religious freedom is found in
God's own disposition toward the devotion he seeks:
Look to it, whether this may also form part of the accusation of
irreligion-to do away with one's freedom of religion (libertas
religionis), to forbid a man choice of deity ... so that I may not
worship whom I would, but am forced to worship whom I would not.
No one, not even a man, will wish to receive reluctant worship. 67
Tertullian went on to explain that genuine faith is freely held, not
coerced. To be authentic, one's devotion and duty to God must be
voluntary:
62. Tertullian, Ad Scapulam 2, in 3 THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS 105 (A. Roberts and
J. Donaldson eds., 1885), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anfu3.iv.
vii.ii.html.
63. Garnsey, supra note 48, at 16.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Tertullian, Apology 24, translated in Garnsey, supra note 48, at 14 (for alternate
translation, see 3 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 62, at 39, available at
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anfU3.iv.iii.xxiv.html).
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[T]he injustice of forcing men of free will to offer sacrifice against
their will is readily apparent, for. .. a willing mind is required for
discharging one's religious obligations. It certainly would be
considered absurd were one man compelled by another to honor gods
whom he ought to honor of his own accord and for his own
sake ... 68
Tertullian additionally affirmed that the emperor's power is limited by
and subject to God's higher authority: "I do subordinate [Caesar] to
God; I do not make him His equal. I will not call the emperor God....
If he is a man, it is to his interest as a man to yield precedence to God."6 9
In Tertullian's view, the state intrudes upon the right to religious freedom
and usurps God's authority when it attempts to direct or coerce
individual religious decisions.
Tertullian's most powerful and insightful protest against religious
intolerance is found in his letter to Scapula, the proconsul of Africa.
Besides declaring freedom of worship a "fundamental human right,"7 0 he
wrote:
[O]ne man's religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is
assuredly no part of religion to compel religion-to which free-will
and not force should lead us... . You will render no real service to
your gods by compelling us to sacrifice. For they can have no desire
of offerings from the unwilling, unless they are animated by a spirit
of contention, which is a thing altogether undivine. 1
Tertullian thus opposed state coercion of religious faith not because it is
ineffective, but because it is contrary to the ways of God and the
character of true religion. The state should not coerce because God does
not coerce-it is not in God's nature or will to force persons to believe in
him.
68. Tertullian, Apology 28, in 10 THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 83 (Rudolph
Arbesmann, Emily Joseph Daly, & Edwin A. Quain trans., 1950) (for alternate
translation, see 3 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 62, at 41, available at
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.iv.iii.xxviii.html).
69. Tertullian, Apology 33, in id. at 89. (for alternate translation, see 3 ANTE-NICENE
FATHERS, supra note 62, at 43, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.
iv.iii.xxxiii.html).
70. See supra text accompanying note 62.
71. Tertullian, Ad Scapulam 2, in 3 THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 62, at
105, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.iv.vii.ii.html. Jefferson used
similar language in his defense of religious freedom: "The legitimate powers of
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury
for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor
breaks my leg." Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query 17, 159 (1784),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 80.
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There are two striking features about Tertullian's argument for
religious freedom. First, while Tertullian's understanding of God
obviously was shaped by Christian theism, his argument here had a much
broader appeal: the desire for voluntary worship is a characteristic basic
to any deity. The rationale is religious, but not specifically Christian.
Tertullian assumed that the concept of God is known at some level to
everyone. His justifications for tolerance therefore were accessible to
anyone who has even a rudimentary conception of deity. Second,
although not explicit, the juxtaposition of Tertullian's claim to worship
the one true God with his insistence on religious freedom as a
fundamental human right suggests that religious faith can be exclusive
and yet tolerant of those who disagree. One can believe that his religion
is true and others are false, but still understand that true religion is not
served by forcing others to accept it. For Tertullian, these were not
incompatible views.
While Tertullian was the first to articulate a general principle of
religious freedom, his arguments were not well developed and had a
somewhat limited effect, being addressed to his Roman persecutors and
not to fellow-Christians who were in disagreement with other Christians.
His writings on toleration, however, are the most important Christian
source for Lactantius, who "draws on Tertullian for his idea that religion
requires liberty"7 2 and in so doing provides Constantine with the basis for
a remarkably progressive policy of religious freedom.
B. Christianity and Religious Freedom in the Constantinian Empire
The church-state question was profoundly complicated by the
conversion of Emperor Constantine in the fourth century and the
subsequent adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman
empire. Tierney suggests that while Christian believers had found a new
champion, "[t]he crucial question that arose at once was whether [they]
had found a new master too."73 The alliance of Christianity with the
state and its coercive power posed new questions: Does this alliance
somehow re-legitimize the claim of the emperor to supremacy in all
things, including matters of religion? To what extent, if any, should the
state's coercive power be applied to convert unbelievers and to correct
heretics? If the state has a legitimate role in promoting the well-being of
the people and the well-being of the people consists of adhering to the
true religion, can't the state legitimately promote religion? These
questions would vex the church for the next millennium.
72. DIGESER,supra note 49, at 112.
73. TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 8.
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Once Constantine took the throne, he looked for a different
approach to the "Christian problem" within the Roman empire. The
efforts of his predecessors to force support for the traditional Roman
deities and drive Christianity out of the empire had failed. The strength
and resiliency of the Christian movement had been demonstrated
conclusively by the failure of the persecutions to compel Christians to
give allegiance to any god but their own. Robert Wilken, a leading
historian of Christian thought, observes that "[a]t the beginning of the
fourth century, the Church was too large, its way of life and institutions
too well established, its leaders too resourceful, for Christianity to be
halted with the sword."7 4  Constantine realized that it was neither
possible nor desirable to eliminate Christianity, so he sought a solution
that would reconcile the empire's need for religious validation with the
Christians' refusal to worship any other deity.75
The Constantinian answer was to secure Christian support of the
empire by creating a polity in which Christians and pagans could
participate on equal terms under an umbrella of general monotheism.
Constantine, explains historian Harold Drake, believed
that a viable coalition could be forged by emphasizing the points of
agreement between monotheists of whatever persuasion, a vision of a
new kind of commonwealth in which stability, peace, and unity could
be achieved by officially ignoring sectarian or theological
differences-"small, trivial matters," as Constantine later would call
them-and emphasizing the beneficent Providence of a single,
Supreme Being, represented on earth by his chosen representative,
the Roman emperor.
To say that Constantine desired to find common ground between
Christians and pagans, Drake explains, "is not to say that Constantine
himself was never converted or that he did not sincerely believe that
Christianity was a superior path to personal salvation."7 The answer
came to Constantine in part because of his own conversion to
Christianity and in part because of the political exigencies he faced.
74. Robert Louis Wilken, In Defense of Constantine, FIRST THINGS No. 112, 36-40
(April 2001) (book review), available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/in-
defense-of-constantine-47.
75. H.A. DRAKE, CONSTANTINE AND THE BISHOPS: THE POLITICS OF INTOLERANCE
191 (2000).
76. Id. at 199 (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 200.
78. Drake provides a fascinating and extensively documented account of the origins,
implications, and consequences of Constantine's religious policy and Christian coercion
in the fourth century. He challenges the received historiography, including the
widespread assumption that normative Christianity is intolerant. In the following
account, I merely shall sketch a picture that Drake paints in vivid detail.
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The centerpiece of Constantine's religious policy was the Edict of
Milan, issued with his co-emperor Licinius in 313, which proclaimed
religious freedom in the Roman Empire. The edict was remarkable in
that it recognized that religious devotion should not be coerced. The
emperors "grant to the Christians and others full authority to observe that
religion which each prefer[s]," because no one should be denied "the
opportunity to give his heart to the observance of the Christian religion,
[or to] that religion which he should think best for himself."79 Religious
observance may occur "freely and openly, without molestation"80 so that
"each one may have the free opportunity to worship as he pleases."
These features, Drake explains, made the edict more radical and far-
reaching than a simple grant of toleration to Christians:
Toleration, a return to the status quo ante, was the minimal
alternative solution. The Edict of Milan embodied a far more
creative and daring solution, defining state security in terms of a
general monotheism, thereby opening an umbrella that would cover
virtually any form of worship-a policy with no losers, only winners.
The edict constitutes a landmark in the evolution of Western
thought-not because it gives legal standing to Christianity, which it
does, but because it is the first official government document in the
Western world to recognize the principle of freedom of belief.82
Robert Wilken echoes this point when he writes that "[b]y mentioning
not only Christianity (the immediate occasion for the decree) but other
forms of worship, the decree sets forth a policy of religious freedom, not
simply the toleration of a troublesome sect."8 3
Constantine's grant of religious freedom in the Edict of Milan
reflected the influence of Lactantius, a Christian scholar and rhetorician
who had fled to the West during the persecution ordered by Diocletian in
303. He subsequently joined the court of Constantine and became tutor
to his eldest son, Crispus. Between 305 and 310, Lactantius wrote the
Divine Institutes to counter the arguments of Porphyry, a Greek
philosopher in the court of Diocletian who had provided the
philosophical justification for the persecution of Christians and who,
79. Edict of Milan, in Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum, ch. 48, translated in 4
TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCES OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 28-30
(1897?-1907?), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/edict-milan.html
(Internet Medieval Source Book).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. DRAKE, supra note 75, at 194. Sanford Cobb describes the Edict of Milan "as
the ordination of the fullest religious liberty the world has known until the foundation of
the American republic. Its enactment is one of the marvels of history, so diverse from all
that had preceded and from all that followed." COBB, supra note 25, at 26.
83. Wilken, supra note 74, at 38.
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Wilken suggests, "was the most astute and learned critic of Christianity
in the first four centuries of the Church's history." 84  The Divine
Institutes not only provided an answer to Porphyry's forceful critique of
Christianity, but also refuted Porphyry's justification for persecution by
appealing to the Roman authorities' own secular ideas of toleration,
which they had abandoned in dealing with Christians. But Lactantius did
not stop there-he "moved beyond the usual apologetic gambits to offer
a positive argument for why religion of any sort cannot be coerced."85 In
so doing, Lactantius provided the theological and philosophical
foundations for Constantine's religious policy. 8 6
Few in history have voiced the argument for religious freedom more
eloquently than Lactantius. Michel Perrin calls book five of the Divine
Institutes a "manifesto for the liberty of religion."8 7 Lactantius is the first
Western thinker to present a comprehensive argument for religious
freedom rooted not in secular notions of toleration but in the nature of
God and of authentic religious belief.88 True religion, he argued, has to
do with loving God, which by its very nature is not something that can be
coerced.89 "For nothing is so much a matter of free-will as religion," he
wrote, "in which, if the mind of the worshipper is disinclined to it,
religion is at once taken away, and ceases to exist." 90 Religious sacrifice
must not be
extorted from a person against his will. For unless it is offered
spontaneously, and from the soul, it is a curse; [this is the case] when
men sacrifice, compelled by proscription, by injuries, by prison, by
tortures. If they are gods who are worshipped in this manner, if for
this reason only, they ought not to be worshipped, because they wish
to be worshipped in this manner: they are doubtless worthy of the
detestation of men, since libations are made to them with tears, with
groaning, and with blood flowing from all the limbs.9 1
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See generally DRAKE, supra note 75; DIGESER, supra note 49. Digeser provides
the most useful insight into the theological and philosophical aspects of Lactantius'
thinking and its influence on Constantine's policy.
87. MICHEL PERRIN, LA 'REVOLUTION CONSTANTINIENNE' VUE A TRAVERS L'OEUVRE
DE LACTANCE, in L'IDIE DE REVOLUTION 88 (1991), translated in DIGESER, supra note 49,
at 133.
88. Wilken, supra note 74, at 38.
89. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5:20, in 7 THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note
62, at 157, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccellschaff/anf07.iii.ii.v.xx.html.
90. Id.
91. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5:21, in id. at 158, available at http://www.ccel.
org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.v.xxi.html.
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Lactantius insisted that persuasion be used in place of threats of force or
injury. "There is no need of force and injury," he wrote, "because
religion cannot be forced. It is a matter that must be managed by words
rather than blows, so that it may be voluntary." 92 Force and violence
only defile religion and produce hypocrisy:
For they are aware that there is nothing among men more excellent
than religion, and that this ought to be defended with the whole of our
power; but as they are deceived in the matter of religion itself, so also
are they in the manner of its defence. For religion is to be defended,
not by putting to death, but by dying; not by cruelty, but by patient
endurance; not by guilt, but by good faith: for the former; belong to
evils, but the latter to goods; and it is necessary for that which is good
to have place in religion, and not that which is evil. For if you wish
to defend religion by bloodshed, and by tortures, and by guilt, it will
no longer be defended, but will be polluted and profaned.9
Those who use force, Lactantius wrote, "neither know themselves nor
their gods," 94 and those who strive to defend religion with force make
their gods appear weak. 95
Lactantius specifically urged Christians to abstain from the use of
force and leave the matter to God:
But we, on the contrary, do not require that any one should be
compelled, whether he is willing or unwilling, to worship our God,
who is the God of all men; nor are we angry if any one does not
worship Him. For we trust in the majesty of Him who has power to
avenge contempt shown towards Himself, as also He has 9ower to
avenge the calamities and injuries inflicted on His servants.
His argument was designed to show pagan persecutors that
Christianity-not pagan religion-was committed to rational dialogue
which had been the hallmark of classical thought. "Let them imitate us
in setting forth the system of the whole matter," Lactantius wrote, "for
we do not entice, as they say; but we teach, we prove, we show." 97
92. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5:20, in 49 THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH, supra
note 61, at 378 (for alternate translation, see 3 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 62, at
156, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.v.xx.html).
93. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5:20, in 7 THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note
62, at 157, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.v.xx.html.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5:21, in 7 THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note
62, at 158, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.v.xxi.html.
97. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5:20, in 7 THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note
62, at 156, available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anfD7.iii.ii.v.xx.html.
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Lactantius' argument for religious freedom is strikingly similar to
that made by Tertullian, but more thoughtful, far-reaching, and
accessible. He maintained that religious freedom is fundamental to all
other freedoms, and that authentic religion, by its very nature, is not
something that can be forced. Lactantius' views presuppose that God
exists, but do not require a rejection of religious exclusivism. Wilken
observes that
[h]is argument is not that Christianity should be tolerated because
there are many ways to God and no one can know which way is
correct (a conventional defense of religious toleration). Rather,
Lactantius claims that coercion is inimical to the nature of religion.
This is the first theological rationale for religious freedom, because it
is the first rationale to be rooted in the nature of God and of devotion
to God.98
This rationale, Wilken contends, "lays bare the spiritual roots of Western
notions of religious liberty. For he saw that religious freedom rests on a
quite different philosophical foundation than toleration of religion." 99
Lactantius' concern that compelling religion upon others corrupts
religion by fostering pretense and hypocrisy presaged the effects of state-
enforced Christianity. While Lactantius undoubtedly drew upon
Tertullian for the idea that genuine worship must be freely given, he also
cited specifically to Cicero for the idea that the gods must be approached
with purity of mind and piety, not ritual, and that godly love and
devotion are not typical responses to force.' 00 By invoking Cicero,
Lactantius appealed to Roman tradition and made his argument broadly
comprehensible to Christians and non-Christians alike.
Although in many ways a minor historical character, Lactantius was
the first to conceive of a comprehensive and principled theological
argument for religious freedom. The immediate influence of his thinking
on Constantine's religious policy resulted in a remarkably novel
commitment by the state to religious freedom, something heretofore
unrealized in his day. We should not be surprised to learn, therefore, that
prominent sixteenth and seventeenth century advocates for religious
freedom frequently turned to Lactantius as a source for their ideas.' 0
98. Wilken, supra note 74, at 38.
99. Id.
100. DIGESER, supra note 49, at 109, 111-12.
101. Scholars often overlook Tertullian and Lactantius when considering the origins
of the Western concept of religious freedom. See, e.g., Gidon Sapir, Religion and State-
A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 597 n.54 (1999) ("The linkage
between religion and voluntarism was first introduced in Christian theology by Sebastian
Castalion."). For a helpful discussion of Lactantius' influence on the development of
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C. The Rise oflntolerance in Christendom
Constantine's policy of toleration gave way to imperial preference
for Christianity by the end of the fourth century. That preference was
supported by the use of the state's coercive powers to punish Christian
dissidents and suppress pagan religions.
1. The Beginnings of Christian Intolerance
Constantine's regard for Christianity became more public after he
defeated former co-ruler Licinius in 324 and gained control of the entire
empire. His Edict to the Eastern Provincials repudiated Diocletian's
persecution policy and called upon all of his subjects to openly profess
their allegiance to Christ as their Savior; nevertheless, he rejected the use
of force to compel belief. Constantine reiterated the view, articulated by
Tertullian and Lactantius, that true faith must be freely held:
What each man has adopted as his persuasion, let him do no harm
with this to another. That which the one knows and understands, let
him use to assist his neighbor, if that is possible; if it is not, let it be
put aside. For it is one thing to undertake the contest for immortality
voluntarily, another to compel it with punishment.102
Constantine's goal was to unify the empire. He wanted his subjects
united together in serving God, not just for their own benefit, but as a
means of achieving political unity and peace.10 3 He believed, however,
that force could not bring about unity; rather, only persuasion and
common fellowship would show the way to God: "Let those who delight
in error alike with those who believe partake in the advantages of peace
and quiet. For this sweetness of common benefit will have strength to
correct even these and lead them to the straight road."l 0 4  In
Constantine's view, if people were permitted to freely choose to become
Christians, given sufficient time and friendly persuasion, the traditional
cults would disappear and Christian unity ultimately would be
achieved.105
Constantine's Edict to the Eastern Provincials also contained a
strong message to so-called Christians who wanted aggressive
Christian ideas about religious freedom and comparing Lactantius' religious
understanding of religious freedom with James Madison's, see Wilken, supra note 73.
102. Edict to the Eastern Provincials, quoted in DRAKE, supra note 75, at 286.
103. Id. at 245.
104. Id. at 244-45.
105. For a thoughtful discussion of the themes and motivations behind the Edict to the
Eastern Provincials and its seemingly contradictory message urging mutual toleration
while condemning pagan rites, see DRAKE, supra note 75, at 284-308.
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suppression of pagan religions.106  He urged that the "contest for
immortality" must be undertaken voluntarily and not with compulsion. 0 7
Drake sees this reference as pointing the finger toward Christians, for
whom the goal of immortality was more readily associated than with the
traditional pagan cults. 08 Digeser points out that "in the East there were
more Christians, and their spirit of opposition and vengeance had no
doubt been cultivated to ripeness by the intermittent series of severe
persecutions."l09 She explains that "with the help of Lactantius,
Constantine's move was to use Christian doctrine against the Christians
themselves. By explaining that true Christian piety could not be forced
and that consequently the proper way to seek converts was through
argument and reasoning, he used Lactantius's ideas to restrain Christian
aggression.""l0 Drake similarly suggests that Constantine "held up to
Christian militants a mirror of ideal Christian behavior to show them the
flaws in their own agenda.""' The arguments for religious toleration and
freedom which Lactantius had formulated to curtail persecution against
Christians, now were used in an effort to control aggression by
Christians.
The emperors who came to power after Constantine's death in 337
were increasingly willing to use the coercive powers of the state to
compel belief and suppress traditional Roman religions. His successors
convened and dissolved church councils, interjected themselves into
theological controversies, enforced uniformity of religious belief and
practice by civil punishments, and gave aid to the organized church.i 12
Laws against heresy became increasingly severe beginning in the latter
half of the fourth century. Heretics suffered confiscation of their
churches and other property, were forbidden from assembling in public
or private for religious purposes, and were denied the right to devise or
inherit property." 3 The first use of the death penalty for heresy occurred
in 385 when two bishops persuaded the imperial usurper Maximus to
agree to the execution of Priscillian and six followers in Spain.' 14 While
the emperors considered Christianity as a means to unifying a vast and
106. See DIGESER, supra note 49, at 137.
107. Edict to the Eastern Provincials, supra note 102.
108. DRAKE, supra note 75, at 303.
109. DIGESER, supra note 49, at 137.
110. Id.
111. DRAKE, supra note 75, at 304.
112. BATES, supra note 59, at 134. For a fuller discussion of the policies of
Constantine's successors toward both heretics and pagans, see 1 JOSEPH LECLER,
TOLERATION AND THE REFORMATION 39-46 (Westow trans. 1960) (1955).
113. See BATES, supra note 59, at 135; LECLER, supra note 112, at 46; ZAGORIN,
supra note 39, at 23.
114. ZAGORIN,supra note 39, at 23.
2009] 511
HeinOnline  -- 114 Penn St. L. Rev. 511 2009-2010
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
complex empire and consolidating their power over it, their repressive
measures were not solely affairs of state. Church leaders sought full
partnership with civil authorities in the fight against heresy. Nestorius,
for instance, in his sermon to the emperor Theodosius upon his
consecration as bishop of Constantinople, proposed: "Give me, my
Prince, the earth purged of heretics, and I will give you heaven as a
recompense. Assist me in destroying heretics, and I will assist you in
vanquishing the Persians."' 15 If it were not for the views advocated by
Tertullian and Lactantius in the earlier period, the coercive strategy
adopted later might be understood as the inevitable product of Christian
exclusivism. "As it is," Drake observes, "either the earlier situation must
be dismissed as an aberration or the later one explained on the basis of
changes that occurred during the half century that separates the reigns of
Constantine and Theodosius."' 16
2. The Causes of Christian Intolerance
A brief consideration of the causes for the rise of persecution during
this period will be helpful in setting the context for what is to come. The
most immediate and oppressive application of civil sanction was directed
against Christian heretics (those who denied orthodoxy) and schismatics
(those who separated from the church). The first step toward coercion
was taken near the end of Constantine's reign and, contrary to the
accepted view, the object of that coercion was not pagans but other
Christians. Drake explains:
Here lies the first and most important key to the coercive turn
Christianity took during the course of the fourth century: Christians
first used both rhetoric conducive to coercion and the tools of
coercion itself not against pagans but against other Christians.
Heresy, not paganism, was the first object of Christian intolerance.
The pattern, once detected, is very regular: it was heresy that
prompted Constantine to become involved in councils of bishops, and
heresy was the one exception he ultimately made to his policy of
noncoercion. Only subsequently did the rhetorical and political
devices first used in the war against other Christians come to be used
against non-Christians.
115. Socrates Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History 7:29, in 2 NICENE AND POST-
NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 169 (series II) (Philip Schaff& Henry Wace
eds. 1886) (quoting Nestorius), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf2O2.
ii.x.xxix.html.
116. DRAKE, supra note 75, at 418.
117. Id.at416.
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Constantine's most inflammatory rhetoric was directed at dissident
Christians. In Eusebius' vita Constantini, he describes an "Edict Against
the Heretics" in which Constantine attacks heretics and schismatics,
orders their meeting places seized, and declares unlawful any future
meetings, in public or private.' 18  As Garnsey points out, "[f]or
Constantine heretics and schismatics were wicked and criminal, pagans
merely in error."' 19
The obvious inconsistency between Constantine's edict against
heretics and his general policy of toleration can be explained by a
strategy of "political horse trading." 2 0 Constantine sought a quid pro
quo with the church bishops whereby the bishops accepted the burdens
of acting as an alternative judiciary (an agenda Constantine pushed out of
despair over corruption among existing judicial officials) and
Constantine in turn assisted the bishops in their goal of achieving unity
and stability within the Christian community, even to the point of using
the coercive power of the state against disruptive dissidents such as the
Donatists.121 Constantine's gesture "would protect his flank against
attacks by militant Christians and win the support of the bishops for his
social and judicial initiatives." 2 2 What happened in the later years of
Constantine's reign, according to Drake, is that Constantine "lost control
of the agenda, and, ultimately, . . . the message."1 23
What explains the acceptance of coercion by the Christian
community? How did militant Christians come first to dominate, then to
define, the Christian message and movement? Why did coercion begin
with heretics and schismatics, rather than with unbelieving pagans?
While there is no single answer to such large questions, there also is no
evidence that Christian attitudes toward coercion in the late fourth
century were the inevitable consequence of Christian theology. Love
and forbearance-even loving one's enemies-are at least as central to
the Christian message as the concern for unity and doctrinal correctness
that presumably leads to intolerance. Tertullian and Lactantius drew
upon Christian principles to establish a baseline for religious freedom.
Toleration not only was possible within a Christian framework, it had
been realized in the Constantinian settlement, with its specific denial of
coercion in matters of religion. To explain why militants succeeded in
118. Eusebius, De vita Constantini, 3:64-65, in 1 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS
OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 539-40, supra note 115, available at http://www.ccel.org/
cceI/schaff/npnf2O1.iv.vi.iii.1xiv.html.
119. Gamsey, supra note 48, at 19.
120. DRAKE, supra note 75, at 348.
121. Id. at 309-52.
122. Id. at 348-49.
123. Id. at 272.
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gaining control of the Christian message, something other than Christian
theology must be invoked.
One possible answer is that internal and external forces threatened
the security of the Christian community in the late fourth century. The
less secure a community feels, the less likely it is willing to tolerate
dissent. Drake suggests that displacement of the "Constantinian
consensus" with its emphasis on forbearance and noncoercion by the
coercive regimes that followed was an unintended consequence of
Constantine's own policies and two significant developments in the post-
Constantinian period: first, destabilization and insecurity within the
Christian community caused by internal conflicts; and second, Christian-
pagan polarization that resulted from the anti-Christian agenda pursued
by the emperor Julian during his brief reign from 361-63.124
The Christian community in the fourth century, Drake argues, was
destabilized by an influx of newcomers who brought with them
"collateral habits and points of view" that clashed with the community's
values and created "a sense of being overwhelmed by 'foreign' and
'subversive' elements." 25 The internal conflicts and strains created by
absorbing new members was a consequence of both the movement's own
successes and Constantine's policies: "Constantine not only removed
disincentives to conversion, but the favor and attention he showed the
Christian community had the effect of making conversion fashionable,
particularly among a leadership class whose antennae were always tuned
to picking up what would and would not please those whose favors they
sought."l 2 6 Some were drawn to Christianity as much for the prominence
and position it might bring them as for the message of redemption. For
obvious reasons, Drake says, the commitment of such "converts" was
sometimes in doubt, as suggested by complaints voiced by Eusebius of
Caesarea after Constantine's death about "the scandalous hypocrisy of
those who crept into the Church, and assumed the name and character of
Christians."l 27
The instability and uncertainty created by these newcomers created
a sense among many Christians that they needed to return to the
simplicity and purity of earlier times.12 8 Within this environment, those
who spread overt heresies or disruptive religious messages were more
likely to be seen as threats to the community's survival. Add to this,
Drake says, the brief reign of Julian the Apostate which rekindled
124. Id. at 408-09.
125. Id. at 423.
126. Id. at 424.
127. Id. at 424 (quoting Eusebius, De vita Constantini, 4.54) (internal quotations
omitted).
128. Id. at 423.
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Christian fears of persecution and polarized relations between Christians
and pagans, and the result was that the Christian community became
more militant and coercive, largely because it had been destabilized by
social and political, rather than theological, dynamics. 129
While Drake's analysis provides an explanation for why many
Christians became more intolerant in the latter part of the fourth century,
it does not explain why Christians sought to use the coercive powers of
the state against religious dissidents. What turned religious schism or
heresy into something more than just an internal doctrinal dispute to be
resolved by the church? One obvious reason is the close tie between
spiritual and civil authority in Roman tradition. While it is one thing to
eliminate individual error by persuasion, it is entirely another when error
is widely propagated, drawing whole groups and even entire provinces
away from the common faith. If the emperor is friendly with the church,
it would not be surprising for church leaders to allow the state to
intervene; sometimes, they even might request it. Both hold an
overlapping interest in seeing religion as unified and as a unifying force.
When such closeness and commonality exist, as it did in the fourth
century, it was inevitable that the problem of spiritual unity would
become a problem for the civil magistrate. John Noonan observes that
"[t]he establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the empire
marks an important turn in which the doctrinal unity of Christians was
transformed from a religious concern into a political one."1 30
Another reason is the direct and causal link made between heresy or
schism and social chaos. It was commonly believed that religious dissent
not only dishonors God, but also leads to licentiousness and anarchy.
Those who spread overt error or stirred up religious dissension
threatened the peace and order of the community as well as its
theological identity.13' I am not suggesting that religious dissent actually
led to anarchy and chaos in every instance; sometimes it did, most of the
time it did not. My point is that within close-knit Christian communities
such claims were entirely plausible. And since the maintenance of public
order was within the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate, the state
naturally became involved in policing schism and heresy. State coercion
was required to enforce unity and community and to keep religious
dissent from breaking out into overt acts that threatened civil peace and
order.
129. See id. at 421-22.
130. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT 41 (Robert C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 2001).
131. See DRAKE, supra note 75, at 422.
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The rise of Christian intolerance in the late fourth century highlights
the inevitable tension within historic Christianity between conscience
and community. The command to love one another is superseded only
by the command to love God with one's entire heart, soul, and mind.' 32
It is this commitment to love God, Lactantius argued, that cannot be
compelled. Choices about individual faith and devotion to God, to be
genuine, require the free and voluntary assent of those who make them.
Such freedom is contrary to the imposed religious uniformity of a
Christian commonwealth, or the relentless attempt to suppress those who
do not conform to the established faith. Then again, authentic
Christianity is not just about individual conscience, but also about the
integrity, solidarity, and witness of the Christian community. The
problem posed by religious freedom is what must be sacrificed of one in
order to protect the other.133
D. Opposition to State Persecution in Early Christendom
The staying power of the religious argument for noncoercion is seen
in the middle and late fourth century writings of several prominent
church fathers who urged restraint in the face of increasing state
persecution of religious dissidents. Almost half a century after
Lactantius, Gregory of Nazianzen (330-389) wrote:
I do not consider it good practice to coerce people instead of
persuading them.. .. Whatever is done against one's will, under the
threat of force, is like an arrow artificially tied back, or a river
dammed in on every side of its channel. Given the opportunity it
rejects the restraining force. What is done willingly, on the other
hand, is steadfast for all time. It is made fast by the unbreakable
bonds of love.134
Hilary of Poitiers (c. 300-368) similarly extolled the free nature of
authentic faith in a letter to emperor Constantius:
God has taught us to know him, but did not compel us; he invested
his precepts with authority by making us admire his heavenly deeds,
but he did not want a command under compulsion. If violence were
used to establish the true faith, episcopal teaching would oppose it
and would say: God is the Master of the universe, and does not need
132. Matthew 22:34-40.
133. See, e.g., Charles R. Nixon, Freedom vs. Unity: A Problem in the Theory of Civil
Liberty, 69 POL. Sci. Q. 70 (1953) (The tension between freedom and unity also exists in
political theory.).
134. GREGORY OF NAZIANZEN, De vita 1293-1302, quoted in DRAKE, supra note 75, at
406-07.
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any forced homage, nor does he ask for a confession of faith extorted
by violence. 135
One unlikely source is Athanasius, a fierce advocate of Nicene
orthodoxy, who nevertheless protested that his enemies were using the
pagans' weapon of persecution to enforce their views. It is "not the part
of men who have confidence in what they believe, to force and compel
the unwilling," he wrote, contrasting the force of the devil with the love
of Christ, "and if they open to Him, He enters in, but if they delay and
will not, He departs from them. For the truth is not preached with
swords or with darts, nor by means of soldiers; but by persuasion and
counsel." 13 6 Elsewhere, Athanasius' treatise against Auxentius (364), he
contrasted the methods of the early church with those who were directing
the church in his time:
[O]n what power the Apostles based themselves to preach Christ and
to bring almost all the nations from the idols to God? . .. Was it
through royal edicts that Paul gathered the Church for Christ when he
was exhibited in the arena? Did he rely on Nero's patronage, or that
of Vespasian or Decius? Is it not through those Emperors' hatred of
us that the confession of the divine truth has flourished? ... But
now, alas, the divine faith is enjoined by the protection of earthly
powers and Christ is accused of impotence because ambition has
attached itself to his name. The Church threatens with exile and
dungeon; it wants to create belief by constraint, the Church in whom
they formerly put their faith when they were in exile and
dungeons. ... The Church, once propagated by hunted priests, now
hunts the priests. The contrast between that Church of the past, now
lost, and that which we behold today, cries to heaven.137
While this passage was directed against the Arians and their protector
Constantius, Joseph Lecler, a leading historian of religious toleration,
suggests that "it has ... a more general bearing, because it seems clearly
to decline the burdensome protection of the State for the spreading of the
Christian truth."l 3 8
Another example of the religious argument's resiliency during this
period is found in the writings of John Chrysostom (349-407), the bishop
of Constantinople. Chrysostom emphasized the Christian tradition of
love and forbearance in an early homily addressed to worshippers of the
135. Hilary of Poitiers, Ad Constantium Augustum, I, 6, quoted in 1 LECLER, supra
note 112, at 48.
136. Athanasius, Second Arian Persecution Under Constantius, in 4 NICENE AND
POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 281, supra note 115.
137. Athanasius, Contra Auxentium, 3-4, quoted in 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 48-
49.
138. 1 LECLER,supra note 112, at49.
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old Roman gods: "Such is the character of our doctrine," he proclaimed.
"What about yours? No one ever persecuted it, nor is it right for
Christians to eradicate error by constraint and force, but to save humanity
by persuasion and reason and gentleness. Hence no emperor of Christian
persuasion enacted against you legislation such as was contrived against
us by those who served demons."1 3 9
When writing to Christians, Chrysostom urged that they show
gentleness and constraint when dealing with unbelievers and heretics. In
his twenty-ninth Homily on Matthew, he taught that "nothing can so heal
[the unbeliever] as gentleness . . . which is mightier than any force[,]"
and therefore urged Christians to "use gentleness to eradicate the disease.
Since he who is become better through the fear of man, will quickly
return to wickedness again." 4 0 Chrysostom explained in his tract On the
Priesthood why coercion likewise should not be used to correct errant
Christian believers:
It ill befits Christians of all men to correct the mistakes of the erring
by constraint. Judges without the Christian fold may exercise
coercion against those who are legally convicted, but in our case such
men must be brought to a better fruit, by persuasion rather than
compulsion. The laws do not confer upon us authority of this sort for
coercing the delinquent, nor if they did could we use it, because God
crowns those who refrain from evil by choice and not by
necessity.... The wanderer cannot be dragged by force or
constrained by fear. Only persuasion can restore him to the truth
from which he has fallen away.141
The writings of Gregory, Hilary, Athanasius, Chrysostom, and
others during this period echo the voluntarism justification for religious
toleration and freedom introduced by Tertullian and Lactantius. This
rationale, however, was met with a strong counterargument for
persecution.
E. Augustine's Theory ofPersecution
The most systematic and profound inquiry into the relation of
religious and political authority in the post-Constantinian period was
undertaken by Augustine (354-430), a philosopher-turned-Christian and
139. John Chrysostom, De sancto Babyla 13, quoted in DRAKE, supra note 75, at 407.
140. John Chrysostom, Homily XXZX, in 10 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF
THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, supra note 115, at 194 (Series No. 1), available at
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnfl 10.iii.XXIX.html.
141. Chrysostom, De sacerdotio, II, §§ 3,4, in 58 PATROLOGIA GRAECA 634-35 (J. P.
Migne ed., 1857-66).
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"one of the foremost religious minds of any age,"l42 who wrote at the
beginning of the fifth century during the Donatist controversy.
Augustine gave the church a powerful and coherent justification for
coercion. While he initially criticized the church's use of civil power to
persecute, the church's ongoing problems with heretics, not pagans,
convinced him to abandon his view that religious practices should not be
coerced. His views had a vast influence on Christian thought in
subsequent centuries. 14 3
The problem of wayward church members was not new. Early
attempts to deal with heresy and schism followed closely the biblical
directives of admonishment and expulsion. For early Christians, the
spiritual nature of the church excluded all recourse to physical force in
favor of only spiritual punishment. Additionally, Jesus' parable of the
tares was used in support of lenient measures toward sinning church
members. In the parable, Jesus compares the kingdom of God to a wheat
field in which the landowner's enemies secretly sow tares; both should
be allowed to grow until harvest, he says, lest in pulling up tares the
wheat also is destroyed. 144 As shown below, Christian leaders argued
that by the parable, Jesus meant to warn the church against attempting to
remove false Christians from its midst, since the judgment about who is a
true believer ultimately must be left to God. This famous parable would
be cited often in discussions of toleration and persecution in the centuries
that follow, and it would occupy a prominent place in the tolerationist
arguments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
As we have seen, by the early fifth century, the persecution of
heretics had become a common practice within the church. Numerous
heretical sects had been identified, including Arians, Donatists,
Manichaeans, Marcionites, Monophysites, Pelagians, and others.14 5
These groups were condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities and
subject to punishment by civil authorities. In 407 heresy was made a
public crime because, in the words of emperor Arcadius' edict, "any
offence which is committed against divine religion involves an injury to
all."l4 6 To provide a mandate for the church's use of civil coercion and
persecution to deal with dissenting members, a supporting rationale
grounded in Scripture was needed.
Augustine initially opposed civil punishment of Christian dissenters.
When he became bishop of Hippo in North Africa in 395, he found the
142. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 25.
143. On Augustine's view of coercion, see Rohr, supra note 45.
144. See Matthew 13:24-30.
145. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 25.
146. Id. (quoting Arcadius). The edict is available at http://www.sean
multimedia.com/PieArcadiusLaws.html.
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church in that region bitterly divided between orthodox Christians and
dissident Donatists. 147  Civil disturbances were frequent, marked by
rioting and street fighting between the two factions. Until about 400,
Augustine believed that peaceful conversation and persuasion were the
only legitimate means for correcting the Donatists and winning them
back to the Catholic faith.14 8 Thus he assured Maximinus, a Donatist
bishop, that "[o]n our side there shall be no appeal to men's fear of the
civil power," but rather he would "let our arguments appeal to reason and
to the authoritative teaching of the Divine Scriptures."1 4 9 In a letter to
Eusebius, a Donatist churchman, Augustine wrote that it was not his
intent "that any one should against his will be coerced into the Catholic
communion," but rather his aim was that the truth may be revealed to all
who are in error and that, with the help of God, they may follow and
embrace it of their own accord. 50 Consistent with the teachings of
Tertullian, Lactantius, Hilary, Athanasius, Chrysostom, and others,
Augustine expressed his view in a short formula: "Man cannot believe
unless he wants to."15'
Augustine eventually embraced the idea that heresy must be stopped
even, if necessary, by forceful intervention of the civil authorities.
Garnsey points out that the Donatists used the themes introduced by
Tertullian and Lactantius to argue that advocating and practicing
coercion was inconsistent with traditional Christian doctrine.152 He
suggests that their criticism of the church not only for favoring
persecution but also for calling in the coercive arms of the state provoked
Augustine to develop a doctrine of "just persecution."' 53
147. The Donatist controversy involved certain Christian clergy who had collaborated
with hostile Roman officials during the persecution of Diocletian (303-11) by "handing
over" copies of Scripture, thereby becoming traditores. After the persecution ceased, a
group of Christians led by Donatus charged that the bishop of Carthage, Caecilianus, had
been consecrated by a traditor and therefore his consecration was invalid. When their
complaints were ignored, they proceeded to elect their own bishop of Carthage. The
controversy continued with charges that any sacraments (e.g., baptism) administered by
tainted clergy or by clergy consecrated by tainted clergy were invalid. See generally
W.H.C. FREND, THE DONATIST CHURCH: A MOVEMENT OF PROTEST IN ROMAN NORTH
AFRICA (1952); TIMOTHY D. BARNES, THE NEW EMPIRE OF DIOCLETIAN AND
CONSTANTINE (1982).
148. See Rohr, supra note 45, at 54-55.
149. Augustine, Epist. 23:7 (to Maximin), in 1 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF
THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, supra note 115, at 244 (series I), available at
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnfl01.vii.1.XXIII.html.
150. Augustine, Epist. 34 (to Eusebius), in id. at 264, available at http://www.ccel.
org/ ccel/ schaff/npnfl01.vii.I.XXXIV.html.
151. Augustine, In Joannem, XXVI, n.2, in PATROLOGIA LATINA XXXV, col. 1607
(J.-P. Migne ed. 1844-55), available at http://pld.chadwyck.co.uk.
152. Garnsey, supra note 48, at 17. Gamsey notes, however, that the Donatists' main
tactic against orthodox coercion was violence rather than argument. Id.
153. Id.
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The first indication of a change in Augustine's thinking came in 400
in his lengthy treatise against Parmenian, successor to Donatus the Great
in Carthage. Responding to the Donatist objection to the church's
recourse to temporal powers, Augustine noted that the Apostle Paul had
included dissensions and heresies along with adulteries, debauchery, and
other offenses when listing the "fruits of the flesh" in Scripture. 154 To
Augustine, this meant that heretics and schismatics were wicked, not
merely in error. By putting schism and heresy on the same level as civil
crimes, Augustine suggested that both could be punishable by the secular
authority.155  This went beyond the conventional view that the state
should punish heresy and schism only when they actually cause sedition
or disorder. Given that the Donatists' antics frequently resulted in civil
turmoil, Augustine easily could have justified state intervention on
grounds of keeping the peace, but he ignored this narrower rationale in
favor of a broader justification for state intervention.15 6
The same treatise contains Augustine's interpretation of Jesus'
parable of the tares, which frequently was invoked by tolerationists.157
Augustine drew a very different lesson from the parable: if the bad seed
is known, it should be uprooted.' 58 He suggested that the tares ought to
be removed if they are easily distinguishable from the wheat (so the
wheat will not be uprooted with them)-"when someone's crime is
known and appears so foul that he finds no defender. . ., then severe
discipline must not remain dormant, for the more diligently charity is
preserved, the more efficacious is the correction of perversity." 59
Augustine's most extended justification for his volte-face regarding
state coercion appears in a letter written in 408 to Vincent, a Donatist
bishop. Augustine offered both pastoral and theological arguments
favoring civil penalties for the Donatists. From the pastoral side,
Augustine maintained that constraint was a good thing because it helped
erring souls return to the truth:
[T]he thing to be considered when any one is coerced, is not the mere
fact of the coercion, but the nature of that to which he is coerced,
whether it be good or bad: not that any one can be good in spite of his
own will, but that, through fear of suffering what he does not desire,
he either renounces his hostile prejudices, or is compelled to examine
truth of which he had been contentedly ignorant; and under the
154. Augustine, Contra epistulam Parmeniani, I, X, 16, in PATROLOGIA LATINA,
supra note 147, at XLIII, 45 (citing Galatians 5:19).
155. Id.
156. See Rohr, supra note 45, at 59-60.
157. See supra text accompanying note 144.
158. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 29.
159. Augustine, supra note 154, at XLIII, 92.
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influence of this fear repudiates the error which he was wont to
defend, or seeks the truth of which he formerly knew nothing, and
now willingly holds what he formerly rejected."'
Augustine was convinced that it was better for dissidents to be forced
from their error by fear or punishment than for their souls to perish
eternally. The compulsion was beneficial and remedial, like the forceful
restraint of someone about to throw himself over a precipice.
Augustine's writings, in fact, are replete with familiar analogies-father-
son, physician-patient, educator-student, and shepherd-sheep-to show
how constraint in certain contexts is a good thing. Genuine love, he
believed, demands it: "It is better with severity to love, than with
gentleness to deceive."'61
Augustine also saw that constraint worked-at least, he thought so.
Roland Bainton, the distinguished American historian of religious
liberty, writes that "[t]o persecute, a man must believe that he is right,
that the point in question is important, and that coercion is effective."l 6 2
From the outset, Augustine believed that the church was right and that
heresy and schism posed a grave threat, not only to the church, but also
to the individual, since outside the church there is no salvation. He
initially opposed coercion because he thought that it would lead only to
false repentance, but when he saw that many who had returned to the
church under legal pressure were happy Catholics once again, he
changed his mind:
I have therefore yielded to the evidence afforded by these instances
which my colleagues have laid before me. For originally my opinion
was, that no one should be coerced into the unity of Christ, that we
must act only by words, fight only by arguments, and prevail by force
of reason, lest we should have those whom we knew as avowed
heretics feigning themselves to be Catholics. But this opinion of
mine was overcome not by the words of those who controverted it,
but by the conclusive instances to which they could point....
160. Augustine, Epist. 93:5.16 (to Vincentius), in I NICENE AND POST-NICENE
FATHERS, supra note 115, at 388 (series I), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schafff/
npnfl01.vii.1.XCIII.html. In Augustine's letter to Boniface on the correction of the
Donatists, he explained that the purpose of constraint was "for that hardness of heart
which cannot be softened by words, but yet admits of softening through the agency of
some little severity of discipline." Augustine, Epist. 185:7.26 (to Boniface), in 4 id. at
643 (series I) (otherwise known as A Treatise Concerning the Correction of the
Donatists), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/ npnfl04.v.vi. ix.html.
161. Augustine, Epist. 93:2.4 (to Vincentius), in I id. at 382 (series I), available at
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnfl01 vii.1 .XCIII.html.
162. Roland H. Bainton, Introduction to CONCERNING HERETICS: WHETHER THEY ARE
TO BE PERSECUTED AND How THEY ARE TO BE TREATED: A COLLECTION OF THE OPINIONS
OF LEARNED MEN, BOTH ANCIENT AND MODERN 12 (Sebastian Castellio ed. & Roland H.
Bainton trans., 1935) (1554).
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[T]here was set over against my opinion my own town, which,
although it was once wholly on the side of Donatus, was brought over
to the Catholic unity by fear of the imperial edicts . 163
The former dissidents' apparent joy and gratitude in being delivered from
their error confirmed to Augustine that the coercion had been effective.
From the theological side, Augustine relied on several passages
from Christian scripture to justify state coercion. In his view, these
passages teach that God himself employs coercive means and has
authorized the church to do the same. Augustine cited the trials God sent
to the patriarchs, the harshness and oppression shown by Abraham's
wife, Sarah (as a type for spiritual persons), to Hagar, the bondwoman
(as a type for worldly persons), Moses' affliction of the Israelites for
their impiety and idolatry, Elijah's slaying of the false prophets, and
Paul's conversion and subsequent thorn in the flesh as examples of
God's own or approved use of hardship to compel, discipline, or correct
his people. 164 Augustine appealed to the very character and ways of God
as a basis for such constraint: "Who can love us more than God does?
And yet He not only gives us sweet instruction, but also quickens us by
salutary fear, and this unceasingly."1 65
The most famous of Augustine's justifications for the repression of
error is his exegesis of the parable Jesus told about a rich master who
prepared a great banquet. When the master's invited guests did not show
up, he told his servants: "Go out into the highways and hedges, and
compel them to come in."1 66 Those found in the highways and hedges,
according to Augustine, are those in "heresies and schisms."l 67  For
Augustine, the key words were the last ones-"compel them to come in."
Such constraint, he maintained, was to be exercised by the civil
authority-the church acting "through the faith of kings."l 68  This
parable apparently was intended to teach that God would include
Gentiles as well as Jews in his kingdom, not to sanction the use of
coercive means against religious dissenters. John Noonan observes that
Augustine "with an arbitrariness of the most fanciful kind ... identified
highways and hedgerows with schisms and heresies" and thereby "turned
163. Augustine, Epist. 93:5.17 (to Vincentius), in 1 NICENE AND POST-NICENE
FATHERS, supra note 115, at 388 (series I), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/
schaff/npnfl01.vii.1.XCIII.html.
164. Augustine, Epist. 93:2.3-2.8 in I id. at 383-85.
165. Augustine, Epist. 93:2.4 in l id. at 383.
166. Luke 14:23.
167. Augustine, Epistle 185:6.24 (to Boniface), in 4 NICENE AND POST-NICENE
FATHERS, supra note 115, at 642 (series I) (otherwise known as A Treatise Concerning
the Correction of the Donatists), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccellschaff/
npnfl 04.v.vi.viii.html.
168. Id.
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a parable about the nature of the kingdom of God into a prescription for
persecution."' 6 9
For Augustine, civil constraint was the instrumental but not the
efficient cause of religious faith. In formulating his justification for
persecuting heretics, Augustine laid great stress on what Perez Zagorin
calls "the pedagogy of fear" to effect a change of heart. 170 Zagorin
suggests that Augustine "did not see coercion and free will as opposites
in religious choice but claimed that fear plays a part in spontaneous acts
of the will and may serve a good end."1 71 Augustine never wavered in
his belief that religious faith cannot be coerced:
A man can come to Church unwillingly, can approach the altar
unwillingly, partake of the sacrament unwillingly: but he cannot
believe unless he is willing. If we believed with the body, men might
be made to believe against their will. But believing is not a thing
done with the body. 7
He insisted that civil penalties were not aimed at making the Donatists
believe, but rather at making them reflect. In his view, God makes use of
the law's severity to get the dissenter's attention:
[W]hy should not such persons be shaken up in a beneficial way by a
law bringing upon them inconvenience in worldly things, in order
that they might rise from their lethargic sleep, and awake to the
salvation which is to be found in the unity of the Church? How many
of them, now rejoicing with us, speak bitterly of the weight with
which their ruinous course formerly oppressed them, and confess that
it was our duty to inflict annoyance upon them, in order to prevent
them from perishing under the disease of lethargic habit, as under a
fatal sleep!
"The role of the state," Rohr suggests, "was to create circumstances so
distasteful to the Donatists that they would be led to reconsider their
errors and hopefully return to the Church." 74
While some commentators have described Augustine as "the first
theorist of the Inquisition" or "the prince of persecutors," others have
169. John T. Noonan, Jr., Principled or Pragmatic Foundations for the Freedom of
Conscience?, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 203, 205-206 (1987).
170. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 30.
171. Id.
172. Augustine, Tractates on John, 26:2, in 7 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS,
supra note 113, at 168 (series I), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/
npnfl 07.iii.xxvii.html.
173. Augustine, Epistle 93:1.2 (to Vincentius), in 1 NICENE AND POST-NICENE
FATHERS, supra note 113, at 382-83 (series I), available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/
schaff/npnfl 01 .vii. I.XCIII.html.
174. Rohr, supra note 45, at 62.
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emphasized that Augustine preferred discussion and persuasion in
religious controversies and always opposed the death penalty for
offenses of a spiritual order. 175  "Christ does not prevent us from
repressing heretics, shutting their mouths, depriving them of freedom of
speech, reunion or association," Augustine wrote, "but he forbids us to
put them to death."1 7 6 He embraced intolerance and persecution only as
a last resort in the face of a seemingly intractable heresy, after nearly a
decade of advocating less extreme measures. For him, the aim of civil
coercion was not to punish but to win back the dissident to the true faith
and thereby ensure the dissident's salvation. He defended religious
persecution, so long as its ends were redemptive. Nevertheless,
Augustine's arguments provided strong justification for the persecution
of schismatics and heretics. Winfred Garrison sums it up nicely when he
writes, "It would perhaps be too much to say that Augustine was the
father of Christian persecution; but if he was neither its father nor its
mother, he was the best nurse it ever had."1 7 7
Augustine ended up far from the principles of religious freedom
espoused by Tertullian and Lactantius. Had his arguments been made
upon purely secular grounds, it is unlikely they would have carried the
day against the traditional religious arguments against coercion. It
precisely was because Augustine was able to justify by religious
authority the persecution of schismatics and heretics that his arguments
were so compelling. His blunder was in relying too much on his own
experience-that is, his own observations of former Donatists who had
returned to the church under constraint-which made him think that
compulsion worked, was beneficial, and led to good Christian lives. 78
"He had the parochial experience of seeing coercion work," John
Noonan observes, "but he had not considered its corrosive effects."l 7 9
Augustine's views remained enormously influential throughout the
middle ages. For a thousand years the church pursued a policy of
suppressing religious dissent, with Augustine's justifications looming
large in the background. It was not until the arguments of Tertullian and
Lactantius came to prevail once again-only after centuries of struggles
and vicissitudes-that true religious freedom was realized.
175. Tierney, supra note 42, at 21, 33. See JAMES J. MEGIVERN, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL SURVEY 36 (1997) ("Augustine all too often
has been criticized for positions he never held and blamed for many excesses that others
committed later, after passing through the door of coercion that he unfortunately left
ajar.").
176. Augustine, In Matt. Hom. 46:2, quoted in 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 60.
177. WINFRED E. GARRISON, INTOLERANCE 90 (1934).
178. Noonan, supra note 169, at 206.
179. Id. at 211.
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F. Church-State Boundaries in Early Christendom
The question of what should be the proper institutional relationship
between church and state did not become important until the late fourth
century. The Roman emperors had their own political reasons, of course,
for joining the church's fight against heresy and schism. In the alliance
between church and state that was forged during this period, the state
undertook to protect the purity of the church and its doctrine and to work
with the church to create a Christian society. Thomas Curry describes
the arrangement:
Although Christendom distinguished between and separated the
sacred and the secular powers, it conceived of society as an organic
whole and envisaged both as cooperating in a joint task, each
fulfilling its proper role. Ideally, both would work together for the
common good. The Church, as the spiritual authority, would anoint
the ruler and bind subjects to his power by an oath of loyalty. In turn,
the ruler, as the secular authority, would protect the Church, promote
the true religion as defined by it, and punish dissenters. The two
powers would work hand in hand to promote a culture, a legal
system, and a way of life based on Christian beliefs. Such a system
provided little room for dissenters, and non-Christians existed only
on its fringes. 80
Brian Tierney suggests that "[a]fter the conversion of Constantine and
the establishment of a Christian empire there was indeed a possibility for
a time that the church might become merely a sort of department of
religious affairs in an imperial theocratic church-state.""' Church
leaders were perfectly happy to rely on governmental authorities to fight
their battles within the church.
The obvious problem with this arrangement is that civil government
now had power over spiritual matters-something not endorsed by
original Christian doctrine. Jesus and Paul had taught that God had
given the state limited authority which did not include jurisdiction over
matters between God and the individual. Although Christian believers
were to obey civil authorities to the fullest extent possible, the state was
not authorized to direct individual devotion to God or to protect the unity
and community of the church. While lacking precedent for state control
over Christian religion, the emperors of the late fourth century
nevertheless asserted their authority and expected the church leaders to
obey them. With the church leaders' blessing, these rulers used their
180. CURRY, supra note 15, at 10.
181. Tiemey, supra note 42, at 34.
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civil powers to enforce religious (and therefore political) uniformity
throughout the empire.
Despite the heavy-handedness of the Roman emperors, there was a
struggle for freedom of the church (libertas ecclesiae) which culminated
in the dualism set out in the Gelasian formula of the fifth century.18 2
Early Christian leaders had resisted the state's intervention into church
affairs. "What has the Emperor to do with the Church?" retorted
Donatus, bishop of Carthage, when emperor Constans offered to help
feed and clothe the poor in various churches.' 83  When Constantius
pressed the bishops in 356 to depose Athanasius for his opposition to the
Arian heresy, one of those in the council, Hosius of Cordova, wrote:
God gave you the government of the Empire, and us that of the
Church. Whoever attacks your authority goes against God's order.
Beware, then, in the same way, of making yourself guilty of a great
crime by usurping the Church's authority. We are told to render unto
Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's. We are not
allowed to usurp the imperial authority. You, equally, have no power
at all in the ministry of things that are sacred.184
In 385 the emperor Valentinian II told Ambrose, bishop of Milan, that if
he did not make one of his churches available to an Arian bishop to
celebrate Easter with his congregation, Ambrose and his supporters
would be driven out of Milan.'85 Ambrose's defiant reply challenged the
emperor's authority with a sweeping reaffirmation of the primacy of the
church in spiritual matters.18 6 Citing Jesus' words distinguishing what
belongs to Caesar from what belongs to God, Ambrose wrote that "the
church is God's, and so it ought not to be given over to Caesar, because
Caesar's sway cannot extend over the temple of God," and again, "[t]he
emperor is within the church, not above it."' 87 As Joseph Lecler points
out, "Not until the end of the fifth century do we find pontifical letters so
categorical on the incompetency of the State in religious matters."' 88
When imperial authority began to disintegrate in the West, the
popes finally intervened in an attempt to oust the state from religious
matters. Pope Gelasius emphasized the division between church and
182. See Rohr, supra note 45, at 67.
183. Optatus, Against the Donatists, 3:3 (quoting Donatus), available at
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/optatus-03_book3.htm.
184. Athanasius, History of the Arians 44 (quoting Hosius), quoted in 1 LECLER,
supra note 112, at 47-48.
185. SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 59, at 67-68.
18 6. Id.
187. Ambrose, Sermon against Auxentius (Epistle 75a), in id. at 75.
188. 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 50.
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state when he explained to the emperor Anastasius at the end of the fifth
century that
[t]here are two powers, august Emperor, by which this world is
chiefly ruled, namely, the sacred authority of the priests and the royal
power. Of these that of the priests is the more weighty, since they
have to render an account for even the kings of men in the divine
judgment. You are also aware, dear son, that while you are permitted
honorably to rule over human kind, yet in things divine you bow your
head humbly before the leaders of the clergy and await from their
hands the means of your salvation. In the reception and proper
disposition of the heavenly mysteries you recognize that you should
be subordinate rather than superior to the religious order, and that in
these matters you depend on their judgment rather than wish to force
them to follow your will. If the ministers of religion, recognizing the
supremacy granted you from heaven in matters affecting the public
order, obey your laws, lest otherwise they might obstruct the course
of secular affairs by irrelevant considerations, with what readiness
should you not yield them obedience to whom is assigned the
dispensing of the sacred mysteries of religion.189
The two powers, Gelasius insisted, rule this world-while the church is a
power distinct from the state, it has authority not just over purely
spiritual matters, but also over how those spiritual matters determine the
way people (and their rulers) live morally in the temporal realm;
conversely, the state has no power at all over spiritual matters. For
Gelasius, the jurisdictional boundary between civil and religious
authority was theological, having its origin in the fundamental distinction
Jesus drew between that which belongs to Caesar and that which belongs
to God. While Gelasius did not settle the boundary between the two
jurisdictions, he did settle the question, once for all, that there are two
different sets of authorities to which humans owe their allegiance, and
not one. 190
G. Emerging Principles ofReligious Freedom
Two developments in the early church period contribute
significantly to a nascent theory of religious freedom. The first is the
establishment of a principle of noncoercion or voluntarism in matters of
individual religious faith and practice. This principle was set forth
unambiguously in the writings of Tertullian, Lactantius, and other
189. Gelasius, Letter to Emperor Anastasius (494), in J. H. ROBINSON, READINGS IN
EUROPEAN HISTORY 72-73 (J.H. Robinson ed. 1905), available at
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/gelasiusl.html (Internet Medieval Source Book).
190. See GARRISON, supra note 177, at 96.
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prominent Christian thinkers, and it formed the basis for Constantine's
policy of religious toleration. The argument opposing state coercion was
based on the idea that true religion is first and foremost a matter of
inward devotion to God; mere outward obeisance and formality is not
pleasing to God. To be authentic, religious faith and observance must be
voluntarily determined by the individual, not part of a program of
coerced religious uniformity imposed by the state. This is a religious
proposition, not a psychological one. The early Christian writers were
not talking about voluntarism or faith in general or about psychological
theories regarding noncoercion of the will or differences between
persuasion and coercion; rather, their argument goes only to the
voluntarism they understood as being essential to exercise of genuine
faith in God.
The second important development of this period is the concept of
church and state as distinctly separate entities. The distinction between
church and state is uniquely Christian. Two authorities are recognized
on earth: a temporal authority, with its powers of coercion against those
who commit civil and social wrongs; and a spiritual authority, with its
powers to lead people toward salvation, spiritual character, and good
works. Neither the Hebrew religion nor the Greco-Roman religions had
separate institutions corresponding to the church. Civil and religious
authorities were one and the same in the Jewish state, and Greco-Roman
religious ceremonies and institutions were part of a larger political
structure that governed all of society. By contrast, the Christian church
arose as an entity completely separate from the state and consisted of a
group of people associated by their own choice, whose common identity
derived from their religious convictions rather than their civic
connections. This church-state dualism was not historically or socially
constructed, but reflected an essential ontological difference between
these institutions as they were established by God.
The recognition and development of the church-state distinction was
essential to the budding concept of religious freedom. The jurisdictional
boundaries between church and state had not received much attention
from early Christian writers such as Tertullian and Lactantius, who
focused more on coercion of individual religious belief and practice.
After Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire, the
dividing line was blurred, with both church and state viewed as
functional parts of a greater Christendom. Nevertheless, the dualism
continued with the church on various occasions strongly asserting its
authority and distinctiveness from the state. As Winfred Garrison
explains,
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The church not only was separate from the state, but for nearly three
centuries it was in conflict with it. The conflict strengthened its sense
of being a separate entity. It might, thereafter, come to terms with the
state or reduce the state to submission; it might locally take over the
functions of government or it might aspire to dominate all states; it
might be submerged by the state; but it could never be merged in the
state. The church remained a permanent testimony to the claim that
there is an area of life which the state cannot control. So it became a
bulwark of liberty and of human rights as against other tyrants, even
when it became a tyrant itself and encroached upon the rights of the
individual. 191
This distinction between church and state had a profound effect on the
development of religious freedom. Gary Remer suggests that
[i]t is doubtful that Locke and Jefferson could have developed their
arguments for religious liberty without the antecedent Christian
assumptions about church and state. The liberal argument that
membership in the state is distinct from membership in the church
and, therefore, that the state should not persecute its citizens for their
religious beliefs, has its roots in the Christian theological
tradition."1 92
Church-state dualism does not necessarily resolve the problem of
competing demands placed on the individual believer by God and the
state. Fuller consideration of this question, along with the refinement of
the noncoercion principle, awaited Christian thinkers of a later age.
III. THE PRESERVATION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN MEDIEVAL AND
REFORMATION EUROPE
The origins of our modem concept of religious freedom are found in
the writings of early Christian thinkers who urged that civil persecution
of religious dissent is contrary to the nature of God and of genuine
religious devotion. Initial acceptance of these rationales led to Rome's
adoption of a far reaching policy of religious toleration in the early fourth
century, but this policy eventually was displaced by the rise of church-
supported civil persecution of heresy and schism. For the next
millennium, the church pursued a policy of suppressing religious dissent,
made respectable by Augustine's theory of "just persecution" which
sought to effect a change of heart through the use of force and the fear of
191. Id. at 95.
192. Gary Remer, Ha-Me'iri's Theory of Religious Toleration, in BEYOND THE
PERSECUTING SOCIETY: RELIGIOUS TOLERATION BEFORE THE ENLIGHTENMENT 74 (John
Christian Laursen & Cary J. Nederman, eds. 1998) [hereinafter BEYOND THE
PERSECUTING SOCIETY].
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suffering. The religious justifications for religious toleration and
freedom, so eloquently stated by early Christian advocates such as
Tertullian and Lactantius, while lost to church and society at large,
nevertheless were preserved by a resilient few who continued to oppose
persecution of dissenters and state intrusion into religious matters.
A. Persecution and Opposition in the Medieval Period
James Mackinnon surely overstated the case when he wrote that
"[r]eligious liberty . . . cannot be said to have existed at all in the Middle
Ages."' 93  The early medieval period was not an era of relentless
persecution, as ably shown by Cary Laursen and John Nederman.194
Christian society generally tolerated unbelieving groups, including Jews
and infidels.' 95  These outsiders (to the Christian faith) were
marginalized within society, but not imprisoned or executed. Heretics
and schismatics, on the other hand, were insiders who had fallen away
from the faith and were subject to persecution, which became widespread
and systematic after the eleventh century.
After the fall of the Roman empire, persecution of religious
dissenters was, for the most part, sporadic and local. Social and political
life in Europe in the early middle ages was marked by instability,
migration, violence, and disorder. During this period, the church was
little concerned with the problem of heresy; older heresies had been
eliminated or had died out, and new ones posed few problems.19 6
Dealing with heresy and schism generally was left to local powers, civil
or ecclesiastical. The result was a wide variety of civil punishments:
fines, imprisonment, banishment, and confiscation of property. The
usual penalty in church courts was excommunication.'9 7
Execution of heretics by civil or religious authorities appears to
have been almost nonexistent during the first Christian millennium. As
discussed above, Augustine legitimized the use of force in religion by
developing a principled defense for persecution of heretics (who denied
Catholic orthodoxy) and schismatics (who separated themselves from the
193. 1 JAMES MACKINNON, A HISTORY OF MODERN LIBERTY x (1906).
194. See, e.g., John C. Laursen & Cary J. Nederman, General Introduction: Political
and Historical Myths in Toleration Literature, in BEYOND THE PERSECUTING SOCIETY,
supra note 192, at 1-10; Cary J. Nederman, Introduction: Discourses and Contexts of
Tolerance in Medieval Europe, in id. at 13-24; Cary J. Nederman & John Christian
Laursen, Difference and Dissent: Introduction, in DIFFERENCE AND DISSENT: THEORIES OF
TOLERATION IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE 1-16 (Cary J. Nederman & John
Christian Laursen eds., 1996) [hereinafter DIFFERENCE AND DISSENT].
195. See Istvin Bejczy, "Tolerantia ": A Medieval Concept, 58 J. OF THE HIST. OF
IDEAS 365 (1997).
196. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 34.
197. Tierney, supra note 42, at 42.
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Catholic church). His theory of persecution was universally accepted
during the middle ages and was not widely challenged until the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. 19 8  But, as Henry Chadwick observes,
51199
"Augustine would have been horrified by the burning of heretics....
He believed that heretics and schismatics could be corrected by milder
forms of coercion. "To use early modem terminology," historian John
Coffey explains, "Augustinian persecution was 'medicinal' rather than
'exterminative'; it treated the heretic as a patient to be healed, rather than
a cancer to be excised." 2 00 Between 383, when the heretic Priscillian and
his followers were burned, and 1022, when fourteen people were burned
at Orleans, there are no extant accounts of anyone being sentenced to
death in western Europe for heresy or schism.201
The twelfth century saw the beginnings of a more systematic and
severe repression. The definition and criminality of heresy-supported
by numerous citations to Augustine-became part of the law of the
church when they were included in Gratian's Decretum (ca. 1140), an
authoritative legal compilation, which became the first part of the
influential great code of canon law.202 For the next three hundred years,
capital punishment of heretics was widespread. Ecclesiastical officials
were empowered to investigate charges of heresy, and heretics who were
obstinate or had relapsed were turned over to the secular authorities for
execution. In 1199 Pope Innocent III declared that heresy was equivalent
to treason, with "traitors to God" being just as guilty as traitors to the
20emperor.203 The medieval Inquisition was established to counter popular
heretical movements like the Waldensians and Cathars, and the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215 codified the theory and practice of
204
persecution. An imperial decree in 1231 established death by burning
as the appropriate punishment for heresy.205
What brought about this change? Lecler suggests several factors,
including the influence of Old Testament texts under which idolaters and
blasphemers were punished by death, the need for the church to
demonstrate its power and cohesion in the face of external forces (e.g.,
198. See generally Pamela Biel, Bullinger Against the Donatists: St. Augustine to the
Defense of the Zurich Reformed Church, 16 J. OF RELIGIOUS HIST. 237 (1991).
199. Henry Chadwick, Augustine, in FOUNDERS OF THOUGHT: PLATO, ARISTOTLE,
AUGUSTINE 264 (Richard M. Hare, Jonathan Barnes & Henry Chadwick eds., 1991).
200. JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND, 1558-
1689, at 23 (2000).
201. Id. Coffey suggests that "this may simply be due to the lack of sources for the
earlier period." Id.
202. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 37.
203. Tierney, supra note 42, at 42.
204. Id. at 42-43.
205. Id. at 43.
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Islam), and the renewed interest in Roman law which treated heresy as a
crime of treason, punishable by death.206 Perhaps the most important
reason was that heresy jeopardized the theological unity which was
perceived as necessary for true community and the common good. In the
medieval world, heresy was a threat not just to a particular church or
denomination, but to the entire social order.2 07 There was an almost
universal belief that heresy was a defilement that must be removed, even
if it meant killing impenitent heretics. Among those who gave
authoritative support to this view was Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the
greatest medieval theologian and philosopher, who wrote that the sin of
heretics is so great that
they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by
excommunication, but also to be shut off from the world by death.
For it is a much more serious matter to corrupt faith, through which
comes the soul's life, than to forge money, through which temporal
life is supported. Hence if forgers of money or other malefactors are
straightway justly put to death by secular princes, with much more
justice can heretics, immediately u on conviction, be not only
excommunicated but also put to death. oa
The heretic was guilty of treason against God and a threat to the spiritual
welfare of the Christian community. Brian Tierney explains that
[t]o medieval people it seemed that [heretics] had rejected God's
truth and God's love out of pride and self-love, the love of their own
self-contrived errors. They had set themselves on a path that could
lead only to eternal damnation and, unless they were restrained, they
would lure countless others to the same terrible fate. Elementary
justice and charity, it seemed, required that they be rooted out. The
Inquisition that pursued this task with increasingly harsh and cruel
measures, including the use of torture to extort confessions, was
accepted as a necessary safeguard of Christian society.209
Unlike external threats to the community, which often unify the people
against a common enemy, heresy rejected the core beliefs and traditions
that identified the community as Christian, thereby endangering the very
things that held the community together. Unity in matters of faith was
considered indispensable to the preservation of political unity and to the
maintenance of social stability and order. "When a common religion
defined the whole way of life of a society," Tierney observes, "to reject it
206. 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 84-87.
207. Id. at 87.
208. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II, Q. xi, Art. 3, in DOCUMENTS OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH 147-48 (Henry Bettenson & Chris Maunder eds., 3d ed. 1999).
209. Tierney, supra note 42, at 45.
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was to cut oneself off from the community, to become a sort of outlaw-
,,210
and a dangerous outlaw from the medieval point of view.
The connection between religious faith and social order may explain
why unbelievers typically were not persecuted like heretics in the
medieval period. Infidels and Jews were marginalized and disfavored,
but they often were tolerated. 2 1 1 Regarding non-Christians, Augustine's
maxim (following Tertullian and Lactantius) remained the rule: no man
can believe against his will; saving faith is not produced by compulsion.
Alcuin, the leading churchman and scholar in Charlemagne's court,
echoed the Augustinian view when he said "belief is a matter of free will,
not compulsion. How can one force a man to believe what he does not
,,2 12believe? You may force him into being baptized, not into believing.
Nicholas I, in a letter to the king of Bulgaria in 866, set out the argument
with great force:
With regard to the pagans, "we can only advise you that they should
be persuaded of the vanity of their idols by exhortation, counsel,
reasoning, rather than by force." If they will not listen, abstain from
relations with them, but "they must not be subjected to any violence
in order to bring them to the faith." One should act as God does, who
only wants a willing worship: "if God had wished to use force,
indeed, no one would have been able to resist his omnipotence." 213
Thomas Aquinas similarly urged a different standard for heretics than for
those outside the faith. "[A]cceptance of the faith," he argued, "is a
matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received
it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to
keep the faith."214  There is no disputing that the medieval crusades
against unbelievers were conducted at times as campaigns of forced
conversions. But from the perspective of the rulers and theologians, the
crusades were aimed, above all, at defending or extending the political
sovereignty of the Christian nations, and only indirectly at converting
large numbers to Christianity.
210. Id. at 44.
211. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 6. See Bejczy, supra note 195.
212. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epist. kar. Aevi, (letter 113 of Alcuin), quoted
in I LECLER, supra note 112, at 73.
213. Nicholas I, Epist. 97, n.41, quoted in id. at 72.
214. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 10, Art. 8, in RELIGIOUS
PLURALISM IN THE WEST: AN ANTHOLOGY 60 (David George Mullan ed., 1998)
[hereinafter RELIGIOUS PLURALISM].
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B. Developments toward Religious Freedom
Despite its various expressions of intolerance, the medieval period
saw the preservation of earlier ideas and the emergence of new ideas that
were to play a significant role in the development of religious freedom in
the centuries that followed.
1. Religious Voluntarism
For the most part, the connection between voluntarism and authentic
faith in the lives of Christian believers was lost on leading medieval
thinkers. One notable exception is Marsilius of Padua (1280-1342), a
Catholic lawyer, who maintained that coercion is inconsistent with
authentic religion and religious convictions which, by their very nature,
cannot be forced. Drawing upon New Testament scripture and the
religious arguments made by early Christian thinkers Chrysostom, Hilary
of Poitiers, and Ambrose, Marsilius wrote in Defensor Pacis (1324) that
"God.. . does not want a forced avowal of himself, nor does he want
anyone to be dragged thereto by the violent action of compulsion of
someone else."2 15 He argued that no clergyman had been given authority
by God to coerce anyone-whether infidel or believer-by pain or
punishment to comply with religious duties.216
2. Church-State Relations
The jurisdictional separation between religious and civil authority,
which is at the core of the religious argument for religious freedom,
began to blur during the medieval period, especially from the ninth
century onward. The Gelasian doctrine-which held that while priestly
authority and royal power both are necessary for the governance of
Christian people, religious doctrine and practice are excluded from
control of the political ruler-was obscured when Charlemagne and his
successors sought to establish a new theocratic empire. Kings were no
longer seen as purely secular leaders, but rather as temporal vicars of
Christ who ruled the church conjointly with the clergy. Church and state
were merged into one kingdom-Christendom-with the priesthood and
empire having distinct functions but interlocked together as a single
religious society.2 17 This arrangement was condemned by Pope Gregory
VII (1073-1085) as contrary to the freedom of the church (libertas
215. Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, dis. 2, ch. 9, in id. at 75.
216. See id. at 75-76.
217. See I LECLER, supra note 112, at 66-7 1. For a fuller discussion of church-state
relations during the late medieval period, see TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 33-95. Tierney's
useful book collects key passages from important original documents of this period.
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ecclesiae), leading to a conflict with Henry IV, king of Germany and
later emperor, over which ruler-pope or king-would have supreme
authority within Christendom.218 Gregory deposed Henry as king and
accepted Henry's humble plea for forgiveness, but Henry's armies later
drove Gregory into exile; in the end, neither side prevailed.2 19
This struggle for supremacy was repeated again and again in the
centuries that followed. The emperors sought to retain power over the
church through appointment of bishops and other means. Asserting the
intrinsic superiority of the spiritual over the temporal, the popes would
claim the higher power for themselves, which included the power to
depose emperors. Such claims were backed by the powerful presence of
the Catholic church in society. The church had its own laws, courts, and
bureaucracy-it was itself very much like a state. National power often
was fragmented and the only bond of unity that held society together was
its common Catholic religion. Pope Innocent III proclaimed at the
beginning of the thirteenth century that "[e]cclesiastical liberty is
nowhere better cared for than where the Roman church has full power in
both temporal and spiritual affairs"2 20 and that it had been left to Peter,
the first pope, "not only the universal church but the whole world to
govern." 221 The popes deposed or threatened with deposition at least six
kings and excommunicated emperors and kings on more than ten
occasions. Papal claims reached a crescendo with Boniface VIII's bull,
Unam Sanctam (1302), and its bold declarations that "the spiritual power
has to institute the earthly power and to judge it" and "it is altogether
necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the
Roman pontiff."22 2 Because neither side could make good its claim of
supremacy over the other, the antagonists eventually settled into an
uneasy dualism in which pope and emperor assumed coordinate roles
within Christendom.22 3
There are two notable features in the development of church-state
relations during the medieval period. First, the early Christian principle
that there is a fundamental distinction between church and state survived
the constant encroachment of papal and royal powers upon one another.
While the medieval popes' demand for libertas ecclesiae was about
neither individual religious freedom nor a modem "wall of separation," it
218. On the so-called "papal revolution," see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 85-113 (1983).
219. Tierney, supra note 42, at 35.
220. Innocent 111, Letter to the Archbishop ofRavenna (1198), in TIERNEY, supra note
26, at 132.
221. Innocent III, Letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople (1199), in id. at 132.
222. Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctam, in id. at 189.
223. TIERNEY, supra note 42, at 36.
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nonetheless reflected a commitment to limiting state power over
religious matters and freeing the church as an institution to direct its own
affairs.2 24 This sphere of religious authority independent of state control
is an important prerequisite to the development of the modem concept of
religious freedom.
A second important feature, and perhaps an even more significant
one at this juncture, is the origin of the concept of an independent civil
state. The beginnings of this idea are seen in the work of Thomas
Aquinas, who attempted to present the central concepts of Aristotelian
philosophy within a framework of thought acceptable to Christian
intellectuals.2 25 His writings provide a theoretical justification for a
concept of the state that was different from the prevailing Augustinian
view. Brian Tierney explains that
[f]or Augustine civil government existed only because men had fallen
into sin. Coercive authority was necessary, he conceded, but on his
theory the prince who wielded it was little more than a highly
respectable hangman, a divinely appointed executioner of criminals.
According to Augustine true justice was to be found only in the
Christian church-and it had seemed but a small step to many
medieval propagandists to argue that the ministers of the church were
accordingly qualified to direct all the activities of secular rulers.226
Following Aristotle, Thomas constructed a theory of civil society that
rested not on the corruption of human nature, but rather on the intrinsic
needs of human nature. His argument went something like this: Because
man is a social creature, there must be community, and where such
community exists, there must be government. "The real significance of
the argument is this," writes Tierney, "[o]nce the idea was accepted that
man's intrinsic nature required an organized society, it became possible
in principle to determine the best mode of government for that society by
rational reflection on human ends and human needs without any
necessary recourse to supernatural authorities. By "supernatural
authorities," Tierney means special or propositional revelation; Thomas
was not proposing an autonomous state, disconnected from God's
authority.
Natural law formed the foundation of Thomas' theory of the state.
Thomas defined natural law as "the natural light of reason, by which we
discern what is good and what is evil"; it is "nothing other than an
224. Id.
225. TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 165.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 166.
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impression in us of the divine light." 22 8 The Apostle Paul described
essentially the same concept when he wrote that all rational creatures
have the law of God written on their hearts. 22 9 Brian Tierney provides a
helpful summary:
According to Thomas, man ... ha[s] his own proper nature, modes of
activity proper to him as man. It was, for instance, natural to man to
live in society. But the maintenance of any orderly society required
adherence to defined rules of conduct, the fundamental one being that
men had to treat their neighbors with due consideration. From this
requirement some basic laws could be deduced, such as laws
forbidding murder and theft. Such laws did not have to be revealed
by divine inspiration. They could be worked out by rational
reflection on the human situation. They were natural to man in that
both the need for them and the means of devising them were rooted
in man's intrinsic nature.230
Natural law, then, provides the basic moral framework necessary for the
order and coherence of human societies. Thomas identified two
additional types of law: human and divine. Human law is positive law,
consisting of detailed regulations that governments make to give
practical application to the principles of natural law. 2 3 1 Divine law is the
commands of God made known to Christians through special revelation
in Scripture and in Christ. The intent of divine law is to lead man to
God, so that he may love God. Natural law is directed toward our
temporal good, but divine law is directed toward our eternal good. On
these Thomistic principles, it became possible to construct the theory of a
state that functions according to its own laws, independent of
ecclesiastical supervision.23 2
Thomas rejected the view advanced by some church leaders that the
state derives its power wholly from the church and, therefore, is
subordinate to the church; rather, he taught that both church and state
derive their power from God. Writing in 1253, Aquinas summed up his
view of the relationship between spiritual and civil authority:
228. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 1-11, Q. 91, Art. 2 (Robert J. Henle
trans. & ed. 1993) (1269-70). An online version of Summa Theologiae is available at
http://www.newadvent.org/summa.
229. Romans 2:15.
230. TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 166.
231. Aquinas recognized that while human law is derived from natural law, not
everything forbidden by human law is essentially evil and not everything permitted by
human law is good. See AQUINAS, supra note 228, Q. 96, Art. 2. Furthermore, not every
human law is legitimate. Laws contrary to the common good (which is demanded by
natural law) do not have the force of law. See id. Q. 90, Art. 2.
232. TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 167.
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The spiritual and the secular powers are both derived from the divine
power; and therefore the secular power is under the spiritual only in
so far as it has been subjected to it by God: namely, in those things
that pertain to the salvation of the soul; and therefore the spiritual
power is, in such matters, to be obeyed rather than the secular. But in
those things that pertain to civil good, the secular power is to be
obeyed rather than the spiritual, according to the saying in Matthew
22, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's."233
Thomas Aquinas thus provided a nascent rationale for the abolition
of the confessional state. Political theorists who followed Thomas
further developed and refined his theory that civil government has its
origin in natural law. While they saw the priesthood as having greater
dignity, they argued that secular power was not subordinate to
ecclesiastical power within the temporal sphere.234 This idea also
strengthened the perception of a fundamental difference between church
and state-a difference that first was articulated at the beginning of
Christianity and eventually formed the basis for our constitutional
commitment to religious freedom.
3. Conscience and Natural Rights
The concept of freedom of individual conscience as a separate
limitation on state power over religion had its roots in the writings of
235 hrtc
medieval canonists and theologians. Most heretics and schismatics
took their stances against the church because of religious conscience.
Bernard of Parma, canon lawyer and author of the widely-studied
Ordinary Gloss to the Decretals of Gregory IX, taught that "no one ought
to act against one's conscience. One ought rather to follow one's
conscience than the judgment of the Church, where one is certain."2 36
The apostle Paul wrote in Romans 14:23 that "[e]verything that is not
from faith is sin." In the twelfth century, Peter Abelard used this
reference as the basis for his argument that it always is a sin to act
against one's conscience, even if the conscience erred in discerning what
233. Thomas Aquinas, Commentum in IVLibros Sententiarum (1253-55), in TIERNEY,
supra note 26, at 171.
234. TIERNEY, supra note 26, at 196. For example, the French theologian, John of
Paris, wrote in 1302: "The priest is greater than the prince in spiritual affairs, and, on the
other hand, the prince is greater in temporal affairs." John of Paris, On Royal and Papal
Power (1302-03), in id. at 209.
235. See generally Michael G. Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late
Scholasticism and the Young Luther, in 20 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL AND REFORMATION
THOUGHT 1, 24 (1977).
236. Bernard of Parma, Glossa ordinaria, X.5.39.44, casus, quoted in Charles J. Reid,
Jr., The Fundamental Freedom: Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.'s Historiography ofReligious
Liberty, 83 MARQ. L. REv. 367, 390 (1999).
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is right.237 Abelard understood the classic dilemma of conscience: on
the one hand, if conscience is the human faculty or intuition that makes a
person aware of what is sinful, then to act against conscience is to sin; on
the other hand, if conscience itself is not a perfect guide because of fallen
human nature, then conscience can err. "A person with an erroneous
conscience was in a perplexing.double bind," writes Noah Feldman, "[i]f
he acted against conscience, he would sin, but if he acted in accordance
with his erroneous conscience, that, too, would be sin."238
Before the thirteenth century, the question of the obligatory force of
the sincere-but-erring conscience had not received much consideration.
One exception is found in the writings of Salvianus, a priest in
Marseilles, who wrote in 440:
It is true that they are heretics, but they are so unwittingly. From our
point of view they are heretics, from theirs they are not. . . . The truth
lies with us, but they are convinced that it is with them. The true
honour due God is ours, but they think that their belief honours
God. ... So they err, but they err in good faith, not out of hatred but
out of love of God since they believe that they love and honour God.
Although their faith is not orthodox, they esteem all the same that it
holds the perfect love of God. How will they be punished for those
erroneous opinions in the day of judgement? No one knows but the
Judge. In the meantime God wants us to be patient with them, in my
opinion; for he sees that their faith is not orthodox, but that they err
believing that their opinion is in accordance with true piety; the more
so since he knows that they do not know what they are doing whilst
our own people neglect what they believe.... That is why by a just
jud ement God's patience supports them whilst it justly punishes
us.
For Salvianus, toleration was a matter of both forbearance and faith-
Christians were to leave to God the difficulty of judging individual
religious conscience and practice patience toward the unorthodox.
Should conscience be followed if it can be wrong? This question
was much debated by thirteenth century theologians and philosophers.
Thomas Aquinas acknowledged that because conscience is based on
knowledge, which itself is derived from reason, it might fall into error
because reason can be flawed.240 He tried to resolve the dilemma by
237. Tierney, supra note 42, at 36-37.
238. Feldman, supra note 24, at 357. For an extended historical discussion on the
problem of the erring conscience in medieval thought, see 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at
93-100.
239. Salvianus, De Gubernatione Dei, V, 2, quoted in 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at
52.
240. AQUINAS, supra note 228, I-II, Q. 19, Art. 5.
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saying that a person who is involuntarily ignorant in matters of fact or
law does no wrong when he follows his erroneous conscience, but the
one who is voluntarily ignorant, either intentionally or by deliberate
neglect, sins by failing to inform himself and thereby repair his errant
conscience.241 Everyone must use utmost diligence and every resource to
form a correct conscience; if a person fails to do this, his ignorance is
culpable.242
Thomas' defense of the erring conscience was a significant step
toward an expanded concept of freedom of religious conscience.24 3 John
Noonan observes that "[t]aken seriously, this doctrine carried the seed of
religious liberty."244 The duty to follow one's conscience was not yet
linked to voluntarism in religious practice. But the emphasis on the
primacy of individual conscience and the duty to follow one's conscience
as it is guided by higher law formed the basis for subsequent theories of
religious freedom. It posited a superior obligation within the
individual-God's authority over the human conscience-that served to
limit the external authority of the state.
The idea that all persons possess natural rights also had its
beginnings in late medieval Christian thought. The idea of human rights
is implicit in the Judeo-Christian tradition, especially in its recognition
that each person is created in the image of God and in its fundamental
commands to love God supremely and to respect the person and property
of our neighbor. This doctrine is important for the development of a
regime of religious freedom, which requires a theory of rights that
emphasizes the importance of individual freedom, dignity, and
conscience. Brian Tierney makes a convincing case that "the origin of
the later natural rights theories is to be found in the Christian
jurisprudence of the late twelfth century, especially in the works of the
canonists of that era."2 4 5 He writes that "[t]he idea of natural rights grew
up-perhaps could only have grown up in the first place-in a religious
241. Id. at Q. 19, Art. 6. Thomas would allow for ignorance of divine and
ecclesiastical law in cases of the weak-minded and insane. 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at
99.
242. AQUINAS, supra note 228, I-II, Q. 19, Art. 6.
243. See I LECLER, supra note 112, at 99-100; Tierney, supra note 42, at 37.
244. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 41 (1987).
245. Tierney, supra note 42, at 39. See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF
NATURAL RIGHTS (1997); see also Tierney, supra note 42, at 38-42. Other commentators
have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Charles J. Reid, The Canonistic Contribution
to the Western Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. REv. 37 (1991);
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION (1983); JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 64-66
(1943). For a discussion of various views on Christianity as a basis for rights theories,
see John A. Henley, Theology and the Basis of Human Rights, 39 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF
THEOLOGY 361 (1986).
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culture that supplemented rational argumentation about human nature
with a faith in which humans were seen as children of a caring God."2 4 6
Several generations were required before these ideas could be
developed and deployed in practical contexts. But the significant point
here is that medieval religious thought began to place a new emphasis on
the individual. This eventually led to nothing less than a massive
reconstruction of what it meant to be a Christian and was another
important precursor to the development of individual religious freedom.
C. Sixteenth Century Advocates for Religious Freedom
The sixteenth-century Reformation did little to end the intolerance
247
and persecution of the middle ages. Persecution by Catholic regimes
intensified because of the new and more powerful threat to the unity of
Christendom. 248 Despite their rejection of Catholic hegemony, the major
Protestant reformers often were zealous advocates of persecution.24 9
They embraced Augustine's vision of the coercive Christian state and
many shared Thomas Aquinas' belief in the legitimacy of the death
penalty for heretics. 250 While Luther wrote strongly in favor of toleration
in the early 1520s, he later reverted to the view that the Christian
magistrate could punish heretics and schismatics.25 1 John Calvin,
perhaps the most influential reformer, established in Geneva a legalistic
regime that did not easily tolerate heresy or immorality. 252  In 1553
Genevan authorities executed the anti-Trinitarian heretic Michael
Servetus with Calvin's support, something that earned Calvin the
approval of other reformers, including the great Lutheran theologian
Philip Melanchthon.2 53 Calvin's special reputation for intolerance
prompted historian Roland Bainton to write: "If Calvin ever wrote
anything in favour of religious liberty, it was a typographical error."2 5 4
246. TIERNEY, supra note 245, at 343.
247. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 23. The best and most complete modem work on the
Reformation and the problem of toleration is JOSEPH LECLER, TOLERATION AND THE
REFORMATION, cited in note 112. A shorter survey is provided by the collection of essays
in TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE IN THE EUROPEAN REFORMATION (Ole Peter Grell &
Bob Scribner eds., 1996).
248. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 23. Several Catholic countries established or
enhanced state-run inquisitorial systems to investigate the new "heretical" Protestant
beliefs. See E. William Monter, Inquisition, in 2 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
REFORMATION 317-19 (Hans Hillerbrand ed., 1996).
249. See Lord Acton, The Protestant Theory of Persecution, in THE HISTORY OF
FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 150-87 (1907).
250. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 23.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 24.
253. Id.
254. Bainton, Preface, in CONCERNING HERETICS, supra note 162, at 74.
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John Coffey similarly affirms, "If Protestantism was all about religious
freedom, no one told the Reformers."25 s
Yet the contribution of Protestantism to the demise of the
confessional state should not be overlooked. As John Witte points out,
the Reformation was "at its core, a fight for religious liberty-liberty of
the individual conscience from intrusive canon laws and clerical controls,
liberty of political officials from ecclesiastical power and privilege,
liberty of the local clergy from central papal rule and oppressive princely
controls." 2 5 6  Protestantism brought revolt against the authority of a
unified Christendom, spawned multiple new religious groups, and helped
recover what it meant to be a true Christian by shifting attention away
from liturgies and doctrinal uniformity in nonessential matters and back
to fundamental Christian virtues such as piety, humility, love, and
forbearance.
There were numerous advocates for toleration in the sixteenth
century, especially among radical Protestantism in Europe.257 The
Anabaptists, one of the most savagely persecuted Christian minorities of
the century, repudiated all religious violence. They were among the first
in the sixteenth century to develop a systematic theory of religious
freedom based upon their understanding of the nature of faith, the gospel,
and the church.258 Mystical reformers such as Sebastian Franck likewise
were uncompromising in their opposition to the use of force against
heretics and schismatics. Most influential of all were mainstream
Reformed intellectuals like Sebastian Castellio, Jacob Acontius, and Dirk
Coomhert. Castellio's writings were familiar to seventeenth-century
English writers and Coornhert was highly influential with Remonstrant
theologians like Johannes Uyttenbogaert and Simon Episcopius who later
established the Arminian tolerationist tradition.2 59 Dutch Arminians like
Philip van Limborch and Jean LeClerc were close friends with John
Locke and Gilbert Burnet. 2 60  As seen in the short descriptions that
follow, religious justifications for toleration were prominent among
leading sixteenth century religious thinkers.
255. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 24.
256. John Witte, Jr., Moderate Religious Liberty in the Theology of John Calvin, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT, supra note 9, at 119.
257. The following brief summary borrows generously from the longer discussion in
COFFEY, supra note 200, at 52-53.
258. WILLIAM R. ESTEP, REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1612-1789 28 (1990).
259. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 52. See J. Israel, Toleration in Seventeenth-century
Dutch and English Thought, in THE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS: RELIGION, SCHOLARSHIP AND
ART IN ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 228, 321 (S. Groenveld
and M. Windle eds., 1994).
260. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 53.
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1. Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536)
Erasmus was the greatest Christian humanist in Europe during the
period leading up to the beginning of the Reformation and was acclaimed
by his contemporaries as the foremost scholar, writer, and thinker of his
era. He sought to revitalize religion and personal piety through the study
of the Bible and the humanities. He stressed practical devotion to God
rather than external rituals, dogmas, and institutions and worked for
concord among Christians who agreed on the essential doctrines of
Christianity.
Erasmus argued that state coercion and persecution was inconsistent
with both the teaching of Scripture and the character of Christ. He
believed it was God's prerogative to deal with religious error, as his
gloss on the parable of the tares suggests:
The servants who want to cut out the weeds before the time are those
who think that the false apostles and heresiarchs should be
suppressed by the sword and by corporal punishment. But the Master
of the field does not desire their destruction, but rather that they
should be tolerated in case they should amend and turn from tares
into wheat. If they did not amend, the task of chastising them one
day should be left to their judge.261
Like Tertullian and Lactantius, Erasmus urged that coercion is contrary
to the nature of authentic religion. In a 1523 letter to Archbishop John
Carondelet, he wrote:
When faith is in the mouth rather than in the heart, when the solid
knowledge of Sacred Scripture fails us, nevertheless by terrorization
we drive men to believe what they do not believe, to love what they
do not love, to know what they do not know. That which is forced
cannot be sincere, and that which is not voluntary cannot please
Christ.262
While Erasmus did not advocate religious pluralism, he took a "big
tent" approach to doctrinal disagreements within the Catholic church.
He believed that medieval scholastic theology had become obscurantist
and legalistic, turning every theological theory into an article of faith.
He proposed that a group of devout scholars draw up a brief statement of
Christian doctrine that would contain only those articles essential to the
faith.263 Matters not included would be left to each person's own
261. Erasmus, Paraphr. in Matt. 13:24-30, quoted in 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at
122.
262. Erasmus, Letter of Erasmus to John Carondelet (Jan. 5, 1523), quoted in
CONCERNING HERETICS, supra note 162, at 34.
263. 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 125.
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judgment. "A few truths are enough," he wrote, "and the multitude are
more easily persuaded of their truth if they are few. As things are, we
make six hundred articles out of one, some of them of such a kind that
one can be ignorant of them, or unconvinced, without peril to one's
religion., 2 64
The concept of nonessential or "indifferent" things (adiaphora)
often appeared in early modem toleration debates. Andrew Murphy
explains that "[ilnitially, the term referred to religious rituals that do not
appear in the New Testament; later it was broadened to demarcate
fundamental articles of faith from matters that do not reach the essence
of salvation." 265  Tolerationists used this concept to argue against
coercion in matters not central or essential to Christian doctrine. Gary
Remer points out that the concept can cut both ways:
The concept of adiaphora . .. permits the [Christian] humanist to
argue for a more comprehensive Church on the ground that
differences between denominations are not essential to faith. But the
concept of adiaphora can also be used to argue for a greater state
intervention in religious matters. By characterizing a practice as
nonessential, it becomes possible to limit that practice while still
claiming that no one's religious freedom has been infringed.266
Erasmus sought to blunt harsh treatment of religious dissent by working
for concord among those who agreed on Christian fundamentals but
disagreed on nonessential matters.2 67
Erasmus contributed to the tolerationist tradition by emphasizing
voluntariness of faith and simplicity of doctrine. The common thread
running through his writings is his conception of religion as consisting
"not merely in ceremonies and articles, but in the heart and the whole
life." 268 His insistence on simple devotion, genuine Christianity, free
will, human fallibility, and indifferent things influenced the writings of
his contemporary and friend, John Milton, as well as later intellectuals
264. Erasmus, Letter to Jan Sclechta, Secretary to the King of Bohemia (Nov. 1,
1519), in 7 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ERASMUS 126 (1974) (letter 1039).
265. ANDREW R. MURPHY, CONSCIENCE AND COMMUNITY: REVISITING TOLERATION
AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 49 n.69 (2001).
266. GARY REMER, HUMANISM AND THE RHETORIC OF TOLERATION 140 (1996).
267. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 51. Perez Zagorin argues that Erasmus never
conceived of religious pluralism as a permanent solution to the problems of his time;
instead, Erasmus "was a pioneer not of toleration but of the ideal of religious concord
within Catholicism based on doctrinal compromise and concurrence on a small number of
fundamental articles of faith." ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 67-68.
268. Erasmus, Opera omnia V, 141C (1516), quoted in CONCERNING HERETICS, supra
note 162, at 30.
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like Sebastian Franck, Sebastian Castellio, Jacob Acontius, and John
Locke.2 69
2. Martin Luther (1483-1546)
Luther opposed persecution of heretics in his early years. He
advocated for "freedom of conscience" as part of his thinking about
Christian liberty. He also drew a sharp distinction between church and
state in his famous doctrine of the two kingdoms. Coffey notes that
"[t]hough he eventually retracted his views and returned to the
Augustinian position, Luther's early polemic against religious coercion
was to be quoted repeatedly by later tolerationist writers."270
Luther's theology emphasized the direct relation between man and
God, independent of priestly mediation and ecclesiastical authority.
Central to his theology are the doctrines of justification by faith alone
and priesthood of the believer. These doctrines teach that the Christian is
dependent on God for his salvation, answerable to God for his behavior,
and called by God to serve others. The Christian is at once subject to no
one-no earthly authority can intrude upon that relationship or command
superior allegiance-and a servant to everyone. The definitive statement
of Luther's position appears in his tract Freedom of a Christian (1520), in
which he wrote "[a] Christian man is the most free lord of all, and
subject to none; a Christian man is the most dutiful servant of all, and
subject to every one."271
Luther invoked freedom of conscience in opposition to the
enforcement of Catholic orthodoxy against himself and others who held
similar views. For Luther, freedom of conscience meant that Christ's
atonement had freed Christians from the duty to obey certain commands
of temporal authorities: "[O]n behalf of liberty and conscience," Luther
wrote in The Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), "I confidently
cry: No law, whether of men or of angels, may rightfully be imposed
upon Christians without their consent, for we are free of all laws."272
269. For discussions of religion and toleration in More's Utopia and other writings,
see ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 56-58, 68-72, and 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 134-38.
270. COFFEY, supra note 200, at 51.
271. MARTIN LUTHER, Freedom of a Christian, in HENRY WACE & C.A. BUCHHEIM,
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE REFORMATION (1883), available at http://www.fordham.edu/
halsall/mod/luther-freedomchristian.html. For a helpful discussion of this tract and its
implications for religious freedom, see John Witte, Jr., Freedom of a Christian: Martin
Luther's Reformation of Law and Liberty, The Alonzo L. McDonald Chair Lecture (Feb.
9, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.pitts.emory.edulcollections/lectures/witte-
mcdonaldl.pdf).
272. MARTIN LUTHER, The Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), in 36
LUTHER'S WORKS 3, 72 (Jaroslav Pelikan & Helmut T. Lehmann eds., 1955-1972). For
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The conscience "must not be bound by anything except by the Word of
God," Luther wrote in The Bondage of the Will (1525).273 Luther took
this position in his famous confrontation with Charles V at the Diet of
Worms. When admonished to retract his radical views, Luther refused,
explaining:
Unless I am convinced by the testimony of Scripture or by clear
reason (for I do not trust either in the pope or in councils alone, since
it is well known that they have often erred and contradicted
themselves), I am bound by the Scriptures I have quoted and my
conscience is captive to the word of God. I cannot and I will not
retract anything, since it is neither safe nor right to go against
conscience." 274
Luther thus insisted on the primacy of individual judgment, rather than
the authority of the church, regarding the true meaning of Scripture.27 5
From this, Luther concluded that coercion of heretics was improper.
"We should overcome heretics with books, not with fire, as the ancient
fathers did," he wrote in 1520, "[I]f it were wisdom to vanquish heretics
with fire, then the public hangmen would be the most learned scholars on
earth."276 That same year, he also wrote that "Christ did not wish to
compel men into the faith by force and fire. That is why he gave us the
sword of the Spirit [the Word of God], so that those who are sons of the
Spirit might use it." 2 77 Luther's freedom of conscience provided a basis
for dissent against the church, but it did not include the right to depart
from the truth of Scripture; it was a freedom limited in scope, but
nevertheless a freedom never before enjoyed.278 While Luther later acted
inconsistently with this view of conscience, the idea that the individual
believer is the ultimate judge of religious truth within his own conscience
further discussion of Luther's views on Christian freedom and conscience, see Baylor,
supra note 235, at 245-49.
273. MARTIN LUTHER, The Bondage of the Will (1525), in 33 LUTHER'S WORKS, supra
note 272, at 3, 49 (alt. trans.).
274. MARTIN LUTHER, Luther at the Diet of Worms (1521), in 32 LUTHER'S WORKS,
supra note 272, at 101, 112.
275. See Baylor, supra note 235, at 256-62.
276. MARTIN LUTHER, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning
the Reform of the Christian Estate (1520), in 32 LUTHER'S WORKS, supra note 272, at
115, 196-97.
277. Martin Luther, Assertio articulorum M. Lutheri per bullam Leonis X notissimam
damnatorum (1520), quoted in 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 150.
278. See Steven Ozment, Martin Luther on Religious Liberty, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
IN WESTERN THOUGHT, supra note 9, at 77 ("In Lutheran lands, Christian freedom in the
end meant the right to dissent from Rome and to agree with Wittenberg. By comparison
with previous practice, that was for the times a new degree of religious freedom, and it
brought about real and lasting change in contemporary religious life. On the other hand,
it was also a new bondage to a new dogmatic creed.").
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poses a limit on the power of the state. Luther's view of Christian
freedom anticipated the argument that linked the idea of the primacy of
individual conscience with the inalienable right to practice freely one's
own religion without state interference.
Perhaps Luther's most significant contribution to the development
of religious freedom is found in his famous doctrine of the two
kingdoms, one spiritual and one temporal, and two governments, church
and state. Building on the two-kingdoms theology of Augustinian
thought,2 79 these doctrines are elaborated in Luther's On Temporal
Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed (1523), which sharply
distinguishes between the secular and spiritual domains.2 80
God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy
Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ; and the
temporal, which restrains the un-Christian and wicked.... [O]ne
must carefully distinguish between these two governments. Both
must be permitted to remain; the one to produce righteousness, the
other to bring about external peace and prevent evil deeds. Neither
one is sufficient in the world without the other. 281
While affirming both the right and necessity of the secular power to use
force to maintain civil order, Luther turned to what he considered the
main part of his treatise: "how far its arm extends and how widely its
hand stretches, lest it extend too far and encroach upon God's kingdom
,,282
and government.
Luther first explained that the state has no right to intervene in
matters of faith because God has confined it to a strictly temporal sphere.
Human authorities have power only over bodies, properties, outward
things; they legitimately may tax subjects for public services, maintain
moral standards, and restrain by threat and force those who injure
others.283 Luther insisted that Christians must obey legitimate political
authority acting within its proper sphere or risk defying God. But the
state must be careful not to overstep its bounds; only God has authority
over the spiritual realm:
The temporal government has laws which extend no further than to
life and property and external affairs on earth, for God cannot and
will not permit anyone but himself to rule over the soul. Therefore,
where the temporal authority presumes to prescribe laws for the soul,
279. See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 376-77 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950).
280. MARTIN LUTHER, On Temporal Authority, in 45 LUTHER's WORKS, supra note
272, at 81-129.
281. Id. at 92.
282. Id. at 104.
283. Id.at110-12.
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it encroaches upon God's government and only misleads souls and
destroys them.... [T]he soul is not under the authority of Caesar; he
can neither teach it nor guide it, neither kill it nor give it life, neither
bind it nor loose it, neither judge it nor condemn it, neither hold it fast
nor release it. . . . [O]ver what is on earth and belongs to the
temporal, earthly kingdom, man has authority from God; but
whatever belongs to heaven and to the eternal kingdom is exclusively
under the Lord of heaven. 284
Luther thus denied the civil authority any power to direct or punish
religious doctrines and practices.
Echoing his earlier thoughts on freedom of conscience, Luther then
insisted on an inviolable inward sphere of faith in the Christian's soul:
"[F]aith is a free act, to which no one can be forced," he wrote,
"[i]ndeed, it is a work of God in the spirit, not something which outward
,,285
authority should compel or create. The coercive power of the state is
ineffective in matters of faith: "But the thoughts and inclinations of the
soul can be known to no one but God. Therefore, it is futile and
impossible to command or compel anyone by force to believe this or
that. The matter must be approached in a different way. Force will not
accomplish it." 28 6 The state therefore must confine itself to matters of
worldly concern and must not intrude into the relationship between God
and the individual:
How he believes or disbelieves is a matter for the conscience of each
individual, and since this takes nothing away from the temporal
authority the latter should be content to attend to its own affairs and
let men believe this or that as they are able and willing, and constrain
no one by force. 287
Consequently, heresy can be fought only with spiritual weapons:
"Heresy is a spiritual matter which you cannot hack to pieces with iron,
consume with fire, or drown in water. God's word alone avails
here...."2 8 8  For Luther, the distinction between the two kingdoms of
church and state had its most significant application in bringing to an end
the state's jurisdiction over spiritual matters. Government must no
longer be seen as omnicompetent; it has neither the ability nor
prerogative to manage those matters that belong exclusively to the
province of the spiritual sovereign.
284. Id. at 105, 111.
285. Id. at 108.
286. Id. at 107.
287. Id. at 108.
288. Id. at 114.
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Luther's position on persecution of heretics changed after 1525
when he urged that civil authorities should root out false religion with
force. Resistance to Luther's doctrinal positions came from both the
Catholic church and radical Protestant sects, such as the Anabaptists. 289
To counter this resistance, Luther advocated that the evangelical prince
promote the preaching of the gospel, suppress the preaching of false and
heretical doctrines, and ensure that all could hear the Word of God, even
if it was necessary to compel them to it.29 0 Ozment observes that "such
behavior was normal for the age; all the reformers at this time, Protestant
and Catholic alike, believed faith never to be freer than when their
doctrine was being imposed on others." 29 1 Although Luther ultimately
did not act consistently with his two kingdoms theology, the doctrine
later was elaborated and refined within both Lutheran and Calvinist
traditions292 and eventually had a profound influence on the development
of religious freedom on America.293
3. The Anabaptists
Neither Catholics nor Protestants in sixteenth century Europe
acknowledged any freedom to dissent. Perez Zagorin correctly observes
that "[t]he right that the younger Luther had assumed to challenge the
spiritual deformities of Catholicism in the name of conscience and
Scripture found no home in any of the major Protestant denominations,
which in principle remained persecuting institutions., 2 9 4 As Zagorin
points out, although some political regimes and church authorities were
more stringent than others in enforcing religious uniformity, the widely-
accepted opinion of the political, religious, and intellectual elites of the
period was that "conformity was necessary not only for religion's sake,
but also for the preservation of political unity and peace."295 Among the
few to take exception to this view were the Anabaptists, one of the fringe
groups of early Protestantism who belonged to what commonly has been
described as the Radical Reformation.296
289. 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 155.
290. Id.
291. Ozment, supra note 278, at 82.
292. See, e.g., 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 184 (Ford L.
Battle ed. & trans. 1975).
293. See generally ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 4, at 3, 56-57; ESTEP, supra note
258; McConnell, The Problem ofSingling Out Religion, supra note 11, at 16-19.
294. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 82.
295. Id.
296. For extensive discussions of Anabaptism, see the outstanding works by G. H.
WILLIAMS, THE RADICAL REFORMATION (1962) and WILLIAM ESTEP, THE ANABAPTIST
STORY (rev. ed. 1975), and the accounts by 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 193-223, and
ROLAND H. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 95-109 (1952).
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Anabaptists were mostly a grassroots movement of disaffected
commoners who preferred a simple, personal religious faith free from the
control of political or religious hierarchies. They rejected the leadership
of prominent reformers such as Luther or Calvin and instead formed
numerous loosely-related Christian sects in Switzerland, Germany, and
the Netherlands beginning in the 1520s.29 7  The great majority of
Anabaptists were peaceful, constructive, tolerant, and, in some ways,
almost ascetic. They possessed common beliefs about the necessity of
the new birth, believer's baptism, the nature of Christian discipleship, the
autonomy of the local church, and the limitations of the civil magistrate's
authority.298 They also, as William Estep observes, "were the first in the
sixteenth century to develop a thoroughgoing position on religious
liberty based upon their understanding of the nature of faith, the gospel,
and the church." 29 9
Anabaptists were persecuted by both Catholics and Protestants alike
for their views on church and state. While their refusal to recognize
infant baptism as true baptism brought great opposition, it was their
rejection of church-state establishments that resulted in them being
branded as extremists and anarchists. 300 Balthasar Hubmaier (1481-
1528) stated most clearly the Anabaptist position on religious freedom in
a 1524 tract entitled Concerning Heretics and Those Who Burn Them.30 1
Church historian William Estep writes that Hubmaier's tract "was a
closely reasoned treatise arguing not merely for toleration but for
complete religious freedom as a universal principle."302 Hubmaier set
forth arguments for religious freedom that were based on the will of God,
the nature of authentic faith, and the essential differences between church
and state. Though perhaps overstating the case, Estep suggests that
"[t]hese are possibly the most revolutionary set of ideas about the subject
that the sixteenth century produced." 3 03
Hubmaier saw the struggle against unbelief and heresy as a spiritual
rather than civil matter. Heretics "should be overcome with holy
instruction, not contentiously, but gently," 30 4 he argued; if they will not
297. See ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 83.
298. ESTEP, supra note 258, at 27.
299. Id. at 28.
300. Id.
301. Balthasar Hubmaier, Concerning Heretics and Those Who Burn Them, in
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, supra note 214, at 94-98. Pipkin and Yoder write that "[o]ne can
argue that this is the first text of the Reformation directed specifically at the topic of the
liberty of dissent." BALTHASAR HUBMAIER: THEOLOGIAN OF ANABAPTISM 58 (H. Wayne
Pipkin and John H. Yoder, trans. 1989).
302. ESTEP, supra note 258, at 30.
303. Id.
304. HUBMAIER, supra note 301, at 59-60 (articles 1-3).
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be taught by "words of authority or gospel reasons," then "avoid them
and let them go on to rant and rage."os Heretics and infidels will not be
changed by force: "But a Turk or a heretic cannot be overcome by our
doing, neither by sword nor by fire, but alone with patience and
supplication, whereby we patiently await divine judgment." 306
Hubmaier denounced the practice of turning heretics over to secular
authorities for punishment. Such was contrary to the will and character
of God, and would only result in God's judgment on the persecutors.
While recognizing the right of civil authority to punish and even execute
criminals "who cause bodily harm to the defenseless," 307  Hubmaier
denied that the state can do the same to atheists and the ungodly.30 s
Estep summarizes Hubmaier's teaching:
These articles express one of Hubmaier's basic principles. He
believed that the matter of one's faith, its nature or its total absence,
is of no concern to the state. By promoting this belief, Hubmaier was
advocating not anarchy but religious liberty. Thus he became a
political theoretician for religious reasons, basing his understanding
upon the teachings of Christ (found in Matthew 13) and Romans
13.309
The final part of the tract argues against the death penalty for heresy.
Burning heretics, Hubmaier argued, supported by ample citation to
Scripture, appears to be an act of Christian piety, but in reality it is a
denial of Christ by self-deceived hypocrites.310 Just a few short years
after Hubmaier published Concerning Heretics, he was burned to death
for heresy. 311
Dirk Philips (1504?-1568), an Anabaptist leader in Danzig,
published a tract entitled The Church of God around 1560, which sets
forth a fairly typical Anabaptist argument against religious
persecution.312 Philips gave four reasons why those who persecute others
cannot call themselves true Christians: first, Jesus is the final "judge of
the souls and consciences of men";3 13 second, it is the task of the Holy
Spirit to convict the world of sin and unbelief, and such reproof is not
done with violence, "but by God's word and power"; 3 14 third, the only
305. Id.
306. Id. at 64 (article 16).
307. Id. at 63 (article 22).
308. See id. at 63-64 (articles 22 and 24).
309. ESTEP, supra note 258, at 31.
310. HUBMAIER, supra note 301, at 64-66 (articles 25-36)
311. ESTEP, supra note 258, at 31.
312. Dirk Philips, The Church of God, in RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, supra note 214, at
98-100.
313. Id. at 99 (citing John 5:22).
314. Id. (citing John 16:8).
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remedy authorized by Christ for known heretics is excommunication;315
and fourth, the parable of the tareS316 shows that Christ does not want
heretics systematically rooted out and punished until the final
judgment.1 Philips concluded:
From this it is evident that no congregation of the Lord may exercise
dominion over the consciences of men with the outward sword, nor
seek by violence, to force unbelievers to believe, nor to kill the false
prophets with sword and fire; but that she must with the Lord's Word
judge and expel those in the congregation who are found wicked; and
what is done over and above this is not Christian, nor evangelical, nor
apostolic.318
To the argument that the state should wield the sword to purify the
church, Philips responded: "The higher power has received the sword
from God, not that it shall judge therewith in spiritual matters (for these
things must be judged by the spiritual, and only spiritually .. .), but to
maintain the subjects in good government and peace, to protect the pious
and punish the evil."31 9 Because of this fundamental distinction between
church and state, religious freedom required limiting the state's power
over religion.
Menno Simons (1496-1561), the most effective protagonist of
moderate Dutch Anabaptism whose followers later adopted the name
Mennonites, also wrote extensively on religious toleration. Menno
taught that the church should consist only of Christians who had
voluntarily converted and separated themselves from the world. 32 0 He
was strongly committed to the practice of excommunication as an
effective but exclusive means of safeguarding the purity of the church.32 1
Menno declared that faith cannot be coerced and that the civil magistrate
has no authority to force men to believe: "Faith is a gift of God;
therefore it cannot be imposed by any temporal authority nor by the
sword; it can only be obtained from the Holy Spirit, as a gift of grace,
through the means of the pure doctrine of the sacred Word and a fervent
and humble prayer."322 Spiritual matters "are not subject to human
authority, but are the exclusive concern of God Almighty."3 23 Menno
315. Id. (citing Romans 16:17; I Corinthians 5:10; 1 Thessalonians 5:14; Titus 3:10).
316. See Matthew 13:24-43.
317. Philips, supra note 312, at 99 (citing Matthew 13:29).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 211.
321. See id. at 212-13.
322. Menno Simons, Een troostelycke vermaninge, W., p. 149; Am. tr., 1, 199, quoted
in I LECLER, supra note 112, at 214.
323. Menno Simons, Een korte klaglycke ontschuldignge der ellendige Christenen,
W., 334; Am. tr., II, 118, quoted in id., at 214.
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urged civil authorities not to invade Christ's jurisdiction over those
matters which he has reserved for himself:
With your earthly and temporal power do not try to make laws for
things that belong to the jurisdiction and kingdom of Christ ... [and]
do not judge and strike with your sword of iron what is reserved to
the jud ment of the Most High, that is, faith and what belongs to
faith.
Recognizing that many of Menno's ideas on toleration were not original,
Joseph Lecler explains the significance of moderate Anabaptist teachings
in the following lengthy but insightful comment:
What stands out among the moderate Anabaptists-and this
particularity is most important for the future-is their doctrine on the
nature of the Church and on the relations between Church and State.
When the humanists protested against the violent persecution of
heretics, they did not dream of depriving the princes of their religious
privileges. Their irenic inclination was not based on a radical
distinction between the spiritual and the temporal. It was different
with the Mennonites. Taking for their basic principle that the Church
is composed of "saints," of those that are reborn, they maintained that
there is absolutely no link between this community and either the
State or the State Church. They built their community on the model
of a sect and so were led to affirm for all practical purposes the
separation of Church and State; they rejected the State in this sinful
world from which they had separated themselves voluntarily, and
consequently denied it any jurisdiction in the spiritual order. In such
a system freedom of conscience is secured by the very fact of this
separation.... And so, for the first time, the separatist point of view
on the issue of tolerance was given expression by the sects that
proclaimed the complete severance of the spiritual and the
temporal.325
Half a century after Menno's death in 1561, his writings commanded a
following among English refugees in the Netherlands, among whom
were John Smyth and Thomas Helwys, influential leaders of English
Baptists.3 2 6
324. Menno Simons, Een weemoedige ende christelycke ontschuldiginge ende
verantwoordinge, W., p. 499; Am. tr., II, p. 303, quoted in id. at 215.
325. 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 215-16.
326. On the link between continental Anabaptists and the English Baptist movement,
see ESTEP, supra note 258, at 33-54.
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4. Sebastian Castellio (1515-1563)
While leading reformers like John Calvin supported persecution of
heretics, there were calls for toleration within mainstream Reformed
churches from Christian intellectuals such as Sebastian Castellio in
Switzerland and Dirk Coornhert in the Netherlands. Castellio, a
Frenchman who was a professor of Greek and linguistics in Basle,
strongly criticized the religious intolerance of Calvin, his former mentor,
for having agreed to the execution of anti-Trinitarian heretic Michael
Servetus in 1553.327 He stressed that the issue was not Servetus' heresy,
but the fact of his execution.328 "[T]o kill a man is not to defend a
doctrine, it is to kill a man," Castellio wrote, "[r]eligious doctrine is not
the affair of the magistrate, but of the doctor. What has the sword to do
with doctrine?" 329 For Castellio, true Christianity is reflected more in the
purity of one's life than in the correctness of his doctrine. While modem
scholars often have overlooked Castellio and his influence on the
development of religious toleration and freedom, Mario Turchetti
describes Castellio as "the lone voice proclaiming the true open-minded
and definitive tolerance, which both the Catholics and the Protestants
detested."3 30 Perez Zagorin calls Castellio "the first champion of
religious toleration." 3 3 1
Castellio's work represents the beginnings of a systematic
conceptualization of the case for religious freedom. His most effective
writing is entitled Concerning Heretics and Whether They Should Be
Persecuted, and How They Should Be Treated, first published
anonymously in 1554, the year after Servetus' death.332 The book is an
anthology of texts from early Christian writers and from contemporary
works of the first half of the sixteenth century. Among the early
Christians quoted are Lactantius, Hilary, Chrysostom, Jerome, and
327. The best sources on Castellio are HANS R. GUGGISBERG, SEBASTIAN CASTELLIO,
1515-1563: HUMANIST AND DEFENDER OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN A CONFESSIONAL
AGE (Bruce Gordon tr. & ed., 1st ed. in English, 2003) (1996); ZAGORIN, supra note 39,
at 93-144; and ROLAND H. BAINTON, STUDIES ON THE REFORMATION 139-81 (1963)
(chapter on "Sebastian Castellio, Champion of Religious Liberty").
328. STEVEN E. OZMENT, MYSTICISM AND DISSENT: RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL
PROTEST IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 173 (1973).
329. Sebastian Castellio, Against Calvin's Book, quoted in ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at
119.
330. Mario Turchetti, Religious Concord and Political Tolerance in Sixteenth- and
Seventeenth-Century France, 22 SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 15, 19 (1991).
331. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 93.
332. CONCERNING HERETICS, supra note 162. In the discussion that follows, I use
Bainton's English translation. The book's contents are discussed in 1 LECLER, supra note
112, at 336-47; GUGGISBERG, supra note 327, at 81-86; and ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at
102-14.
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Augustine. Sixteenth century sources appear in part under pseudonyms
(including some of Castellio's own writing) and in part with the full
names of the authors. They include Martin Luther, Sebastian Franck,
Erasmus, John Brenz, and Conrad Pellikan. There is even a short excerpt
from John Calvin. Leonard Levy calls Concerning Heretics "the
sixteenth century's first book on religious liberty," 3 33 while Brian
Tierney says that the tract "provided the first full-scale argument for
freedom of conscience." 3 34
The most significant text in Concerning Heretics is the prefatory
dedication to Duke Christophe of Wiirtemburg written by Martin Bellius,
Castellio's pseudonym. Castellio lamented that Christians were
quarreling with each other over matters that do not "need to be known
for salvation by faith" or "make a man better," rather than seeking to
draw near to Christ by living more faithful lives. 3 3 5 Much of this
disagreement, in his view, was not over fundamental truths of the
Christian faith, but rather over more obscure questions like baptism,
communion, predestination, free will, and invocation of saints. It was
senseless and cruel for Christians "to visit daily penalties upon those who
differ from the mighty about matters hitherto unknown, for so many
centuries disputed, and not yet cleared up."33 6 Castellio warned that
putting people to death simply because they differ on such secondary
matters is horribly wrong: "Satan could not devise anything more
repugnant to the nature and will of Christ!" 3 37
Castellio did not deny the danger of heresy, but thought the
appellation often was misapplied. He understood the New Testament to
use the term heretic to describe someone who clearly is guilty of
obstinate error.3 3 8 "I hate heretics, too," Castellio wrote,
[but] I speak because I see here two great dangers. And the first is
that he be held for a heretic, who is not a heretic. . . . Great care must
be exercised to distinguish those who are really seditious from
Christians. Outwardly they do the same thing and are adjudged
guilty of the same crime by those who do not understand. Christ was
crucified among thieves. The other danger is that he who is really a
heretic be punished more severely or in a manner other than that
required by Christian discipline.339
333. LEONARD LEVY, BLASPHEMY 226 (1993).
334. Tierney, supra note 42, at 47.
335. Martin Bellius, Dedication to Duke Christophe, in CONCERNING HERETICS, supra
note 162, at 122.
336. Id. at 123.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 130.
339. Id. at 126.
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Having carefully investigated the meaning of the term "heretic" as
commonly used in his time, Castellio concluded:
I can discover no more than this, that we regard those as heretics with
whom we disagree. This is evident from the fact that today there is
scarcely one of our innumerable sects that does not look upon the rest
as heretics, so that if you are orthodox in one city or region, you are
held for a heretic in the next.340
Castellio's solution was that Christians must not judge those with
whom they disagree, but rather instruct them and win them over through
true piety and a just life. Christians must forbear, not to find the truth,
but because they have the truth:
[L]et us, who are Christians, not condemn one another, but, if we are
wiser than they, let us also be better and more merciful. This is
certain that the better a man knows the truth, the less is he inclined to
condemn, as appears in the case of Christ and the apostles.... He
who does not know how to act mercifully and kindly does not know
the nature of mercy and kindness, just as he who cannot blush does
not know the nature of shame.341
Castellio urged mercy and kindness when disputing nonessential
doctrines: "Even though in some matters we disagreed, yet should we
consent together and forbear one another in love, which is the bond of
peace, until we arrive at the unity of the faith."3 4 2
Writing again under the pseudonym Bellius, Castellio included in
the French translation of Concerning Heretics an additional and much
shorter dedication to Count William of Hesse, the son-in-law of Duke
Christophe. Castellio urged that princes should not kill anyone for
holding certain religious beliefs, "which above all else should be free,"
because matters of belief are beyond the reach of the civil power.34 3 He
argued that civil authority has no jurisdiction over spiritual offenses like
heresy; heretics should be excommunicated by the church and nothing
more. Only if spiritual offenders create civil disturbances are they
punishable by the magistrate.344 Castellio also returned to his theme of
"ambiguous doctrines" that are secondary to the fundamental truths of
Christianity. It is sufficient, he urged, that Christians agree to the latter,
while being permitted to differ over the former.
340. Id. at 129.
341. Id. at 132-33.
342. Id. at 133.
343. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 109.
344. Martin Bellius, Dedication to Duke Christophe, in CONCERNING HERETICS, supra
note 162, at 136-38.
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Castellio added a pair of statements at the end of Concerning
Heretics printed under the names of George Kleinberg and Basil
Montfort. Writing as Kleinberg, Castellio exhorted rulers and
magistrates to end the persecution of those who disagree about obscure
passages of Scripture and have committed no offense worse than
ignorance and error. He reminded them of Jesus' parable of the tares,
which commands that heretics are to be left until the final judgment of
God. Again, he drew a jurisdictional limit on the power of the state.
Civil rulers are to wield the sword to protect the good from evildoers, not
to enforce and defend theological doctrine. "If a good physician can
defend his opinions without the aid of the magistrate, why cannot the
theologian do the like? Christ could, the apostles could; surely their
disciples can. Defend bodies with the bodily sword. The sword cannot
touch the soul." 345 Citing numerous biblical commands and examples
opposing persecution, Castellio concluded that "[h]e who suffers
persecution for the faith is either correct or mistaken. If he is correct he
should not be harmed. If he is mistaken he should be forgiven."346
Writing as Montfort, Castellio addressed the scriptural arguments
commonly used to support persecution. He rejected appeals to the Old
Testament to justify killing for religion and stressed that neither Christ
nor the apostles used or sanctioned violence against heretics.347 Joseph
Lecler points out that "[u]ntil then no one had subjected to such
searching criticism the Scriptural texts that could be used in support of
the spirit of persecution."348 Castellio also argued that the civil
magistrate lacks power to propagate religion by force and, therefore,
should not meddle in religious matters. When the state uses its power to
coerce religion, error and spiritual tyranny take hold and men are
compelled to follow whatever doctrines their persecutors assert. The
statement concludes with a series of biblical images and a short biblical
argument showing that persecutors belong with the scribes, Pharisees,
Herod, Pilate, and other cruel, ungodly men who stood against Christ.34 9
Castellio thus deployed three major arguments against religious
persecution in Concerning Heretics. The first was that religious
persecution is contrary to the nature and will of God. Castellio's desire
for toleration was sustained by the deeply-held belief that persecution is
cruel and inhumane, and therefore contrary to Christ's character and
345. George Kleinberg, On How Persecution Hurts the World, in CONCERNING
HERETICS, supra note 162, at 221.
346. Id. at 223.
347. Basil Montfort, Refutation of the Reasons Commonly Alleged in Favor of
Persecution, in CONCERNING HERETICS, supra note 162, at 225-37.
348. 1 LECLER, supra note 112, at 346.
349. Montfort, supra note 347, at 251.
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teachings. Persecutors invariably are acting against the cause of Christ,
while among the persecuted are often the most godly and just. There is
nothing in sacred Scripture, he argued, that sanctions the use of civil
punishments or violence to protect the church from heresy. Such
persecution is attributable to evil, not to God.
The second argument was that Christians must practice humility and
forbearance regarding the nonessential doctrines of the Bible. Castellio
did not doubt the fundamental truths of the Christian faith, but he argued
that the arcane theological disputes which divided the Christian churches
of his day should be replaced with charity, mercy, and kindness. As
Zagorin notes, Castellio "is in no way a skeptic in religion, as he is
convinced that the fundamental religious and moral teachings of the
Christian faith are easily known and understandable to all believers."3 50
While Castellio believed that Christians can be certain about the essential
teachings of the Christian faith, such as the existence of God, the
authority of the Bible, and the necessity of faith in Christ for salvation,
he acknowledged that differences of opinion regarding the obscure,
uncertain, and debatable parts of Scripture were both legitimate and
inevitable. Christians disagreed over nonessential or indifferent matters,
Castellio insisted, precisely because such matters were not clearly
revealed in Scripture. If these matters were indeed of fundamental
importance, Castellio reasoned, God would have made their meaning
clear. Until that happens, Castellio urged, Christians should be humble,
patient, and forbearing with one another in their differences over
nonessential doctrines.
The third argument was that the civil magistrate is neither
authorized nor competent to judge or punish religion. Spiritual offenses
can be judged only by the word of God and are punishable at most by
excommunication. Although he did not spell it out, implicit in this is the
recognition of a right to conscience as a limit on the power of the state.351
Castellio believed that force is powerless to change belief or conscience,
and that its application corrupts religion and opens the door to error and
spiritual tyranny. Each of these three arguments is grounded in
Castellio's theology. As Zagorin observes, "Since the work was very
largely a Christian indictment of the persecuting spirit, it is easy to
understand why in his own contributions he quoted only the Bible, upon
whose authority he relied exclusively." 352
350. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 113.
351. See id. at 113-14.
352. Id. at 112.
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Concerning Heretics was the opening salvo in a long-running battle
between Castellio and Calvin over the ideas that led to Servetus' death.353
In 1554 Castellio wrote Against Calvin's Book, an answer to Calvin's
Defense of the Orthodox Faith, which had set forth a justification for
persecution of heretics.354 Zagorin describes the work as "a direct,
unsparing attack on Calvin's ideas and good faith, composed in a tone
that is sometimes angry, bitter, and accusing." 3  One striking example is
Castellio's description of the prevailing intolerance in Calvin's Geneva:
"If Christ himself came to Geneva," he wrote, "he would be crucified.
For Geneva is not a place of Christian liberty. It is ruled by a new pope,
but one who burns men alive, while the pope at Rome at least strangles
,,356them first. A main theme in Against Calvin's Book is criticism of
Calvin's claim that civil rulers and magistrates have a duty to defend true
doctrine with force. To this claim, Castellio offered the famous reply:
"To kill a man is not do defend a doctrine, it is to kill a man. When the
Genevans killed Servetus, they did not defend a doctrine, they killed a
man."357 The defense of religious doctrine is not the business of the
magistrate, Castellio argued, but rather the theologian; the magistrate is
obliged to protect those under his jurisdiction from injustice. Zagorin
observes that
Castellio strives consistently to demarcate the realm of the spiritual
from the secular and to limit civil government's power over religion.
He maintains that the magistrate has no jurisdiction in spiritual
matters nor any obligation to enforce the Mosaic law, since this law
has been superseded by Christ's spiritual law of love and charity.
Magistracy exists to prevent men from doing evil, and when the
magistrate punishes crimes such as homicide or adultery, he upholds
not the law of Moses, but the law of nature and equity.
Castellio's denial of the magistrate's right to punish divergent religious
opinions went very much against the prevailing views of his time.
Instead, he was convinced that the use of civil force to protect religion
does great harm to religion and that religious freedom is impossible
without limiting the magistrate's power over religion.
Castellio's third major work on religious toleration, completed in
1555, was written under the pseudonym Basil Montfort and titled
Concerning the Nonpunishment of Heretics by the Civil Magistrate, a
353. Id. at 114.
354. For a helpful and extended discussion of Castellio's arguments in Against
Calvin's Book, see id. at 114-22. I have drawn on that discussion here.
355. Id. at 115.
356. Sebastian Castellio, Against Calvin 's Book, quoted in id. at 116.
357. Id.at119.
358. ZAGORN, supra note 39, at 119.
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Book in Support of the Farrago of Martin Bellius against the Book of
Theodore Beza.3 59 It was Castellio's reply to Theodore Beza, Calvin's
disciple and confidant, who had published in 1554 a refutation of
Castellio's Concerning Heretics.3 60 Castellio once more explained why
the perpetrators of Servetus' execution were wrong to kill heretics and to
treat as heretics all who disagree with the church. Castellio again
attacked the Calvinist view that the state has the duty to protect the purity
of the church by punishing heresy. Beza had argued that the state's duty
was derived from the purpose of civil society, which was that men live
together peacefully and fulfill their supreme obligation to love and serve
God. Heresy is destructive of religion and good order, he urged, and no
measure is severe enough to stop the mad heretic from spreading his
contagion. Castellio rejected this view and warned that if rulers exercise
power over religion, there will be no "freedom of religion." 6' He
recognized that the civil magistrate has jurisdiction over civil matters,
and, by the command of God, must be obeyed. But religious doctrine is a
spiritual matter which the magistrate has no right to judge or enforce.
Zagorin summarizes Castellio's argument:
He does concede that the magistrate is authorized to repress offenses
like the manifest blasphemy of denial that God exists, because these
are contrary to the law of nature known to all nations. But crimes of
this kind, which are recognized by the common sense of all nations,
do not need to be identified by theologians. The magistrate has no
authority, however, to punish heretics, a claim Castellio bases on the
fundamental distinction between the spiritual and the secular.362
Castellio found unpersuasive Augustine's argument that civil penalties
are aimed at making heretics reflect on their error and restraining them
from continuing to do what is evil. Constraint in religion is contrary to
Scripture, Castellio argued, and "forces people to pretend to believe."36 3
We must, he said, "obey God rather than Saint Augustine." 36 4
One of Castellio's last literary contributions to the struggle for
religious toleration and freedom was Advice to a Desolate France,
359. Zagorin also has an excellent discussion of Castellio's arguments in Concerning
the Nonpunishment of Heretics in ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 124-32. Zagorin's
quotations are taken from the French translation. Again, I have generously drawn on his
discussion here.
360. On Theodore Beza and the arguments in his book, see I LECLER, supra note 112,
at 347-50 and GUGGISBERG, supra note 327, at 110-14.
361. Sebastian Castellio, Concerning the Nonpunishment of Heretics by the Civil
Magistrate, a Book in Support of the Farrago of Martin Bellius against the Book of
Theodore Beza, quoted in ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 128.
362. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 128.
363. Castellio, supra note 356, at 129.
364. Id.
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published anonymously in 1562, in which he called for a stop to the
religious civil war between the French Catholics and Protestant
Calvinists (Huguenots). 6 s Zagorin highlights the stark contrast between
Castellio and the French politiques who sought toleration for political
and pragmatic reasons:
Although earlier voices . . . had been raised in France to arrest the
drift toward a war of religion, they were all the expressions of
Catholics who were politically motivated to advocate a restricted
tolerance for Protestant worship to save the kingdom from a
destructive civil war. While these writers also stressed that
conscience was not subject to compulsion, their primary concern was
for the unity and welfare of the state. Castellio was the first author at
this juncture to plead for confessional tolerance in France principally
on the religious and moral round of respect for conscience and not
only for pragmatic reasons. 6
Invoking Christ's teaching on reciprocity (the Golden Rule), Castellio
blamed both Catholics and Protestants for forcing one another's
consciences: "For it would then but be necessary to say to those who
force the consciences of others: 'Would you like your own to be
forced?"' 36 7 Unless the persecutors changed their ways and practiced
toleration, "you will be unable to say that you have done to others as you
would like others to do to you."3 68  He challenged the politiques to
produce a single word or example from Scripture to prove that they must
force consciences. Such a practice, Castellio argued, was contrary to
God's nature and commands, and cannot be justified by good intentions.
Castellio's writings plainly show that his arguments for religious
toleration and freedom are themselves grounded in religion. In his view,
religious freedom is necessary because (1) God alone knows the real
heretics and he alone has the authority to punish them at the last
judgment; (2) coercion and persecution reflect neither the character nor
command of Christ; (3) God has not granted the civil magistrate any
power over religious matters; (4) religious truth and toleration can co-
exist without destroying religion; and (5) intolerance and persecution
does great harm to authentic Christianity. His opposition to state
persecution of religious dissenters was dictated not by religious
skepticism or political expediency, but rather by an abiding concern for
the welfare of authentic Christianity. His ideas influenced important
365. The most accessible copy of this short tract is found in Sebastian Castellio,
Advice to a Desolate France, in RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, supra note 214, at 100-15.
366. ZAGORIN, supra note 39, at 134-35 (footnotes omitted).
367. Castellio, supra note 365, at 101.
368. Id. at 102.
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seventeenth-century tolerationists, most notably William Walwyn,
Jeremy Taylor, Roger Williams, and John Locke.369
5. Dirk Coornhert (1522-1590)
Coornhert, a Reformed theologian from the Netherlands, argued that
conscience belongs to God's domain and may not be manipulated or
"cured" from outside.3 70 The state despises God, in his view, when it
usurps his place by exercising power over a person's conscience.3 71 He
urged in his Constraint of Conscience (1579) that "[o]nly God has the
right to be master over man's soul and conscience; it is man's right to
have freedom of conscience."3 72
Scripture figured prominently in Coornhert's defense of conscience.
The crux of his biblical argument for toleration was that the term heretic
does not appear in the Old Testament, and that the only punishment for
heresy indicated in the New Testament is banishment. If God intended
to use the secular arm for eliminating heretics, Coornhert argued, Christ
would have made that clear in the New Testament. Coornhert also
appealed to Christ as the example: when many left his side, he never
tried to force his followers to stay with him. The actions of Christ and
his followers show that persecution is not authorized by God:
I also know from the full testimony of H. Scripture, that true
followers of the Lamb do not persecute anyone, but that they are
persecuted, and that no authorities, be they spiritual or secular, can
produce proof that they were commanded by God to persecute or
physically kill anyone for their misbelief (I am not speaking of
misdeed) .. .
Coornhert further appealed to the example of Gamaliel, the Jewish leader
who warned his colleagues against persecuting Christians lest they find
themselves fighting against God, and the parable of the wheat and tares
to support his defense of conscience.3 74 Coornhert also invoked the
Golden Rule: "Let everyone follow the law of nature: if you do not like
being forced in your conscience, then do not force others either in word
or in deed."3 7 5
369. GUGGISBERG, supra note 327, at 247-49; Tierney, supra note 42, at 49.
370. GERRIT VOOGT, CONSTRAINT ON TRIAL: DIRCK VOLCKERTSZ COORNHERT AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 104 (2000) (Sixteenth Century Essays & Studies, v. 52). Voogt's
book is the best work in English on Coomhert.
371. Id. (citing Coomhert, Oordeelen van een ghemeen Landts, in WERCKEN, VOL 1,
fol. "643C" (should be 463C)).
372. Dirk Coornhert, Constraint of Conscience (1579), quoted in id. at 104.
373. Id. at 117.
374. Id. at 118 (citing Acts 5:36-39 and Matthew 13:24-43).
375. Id. at 119-20 (citing Matthew 7:12).
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Coornhert appealed to the primacy of the individual conscience.
Along with other toleration advocates, Coornhert argued that coercion of
religious conscience does not work and may be counterproductive.3 76
Gerrit Voogt summarizes Coornhert's views on this point:
God wants to be praised voluntarily. People become godless due to
persecution, for they forsake God to save themselves. Persecution,
besides killing heretics, also breeds hypocrites, people who only
feign that they have abandoned their former opinions. Persecution
embitters people, some of whom will be tempted to resort to violence
when they see their "highest good" [their freedom of conscience]
377taken away ... 
He also maintained that the state has authority over "body and world
goods," but not over the hearts of its citizens and that "God reveals the
truth through prophets, not through the government."7 Government
does not have the right, Coornhert asserted, to impose its interpretation
or choice of religion, since the state typically knows little about matters
of faith and has no impartial or infallible criterion for identifying the true
religion. 3 79 As Voogt explains, Coornhert believed that "[t]he political
government should act as an impartial referee to ensure that the various
religious groups do not try to tyrannize the others and that a new church
does not put on the well-worn shoes of the popes of old." 3 0 Otherwise,
the state should leave individuals alone to follow the promptings of their
own conscience.
While no exhaustive investigation has been attempted of
Coornhert's posthumous influence, Voogt suggests that the Rijnsburger
Collegiants were chiefly influenced by his ideas, and perhaps this
influence extended indirectly to Wesley and Methodism. 381 Coornhert's
impact on the Arminian remonstrants is assumed, as he is widely
identified as their forerunner.3 82
The cause of religious freedom in the sixteenth century was
sustained by Christian intellectuals like Erasmus, Castellio, and
Coomhert, as well as by various sects and groups such as the
Anabaptists, Baptists, Mennonites, Socinians, Arminians in Holland, and
Latitudinarians in the Church of England. They were moved not by
376. Id. at 150.
377. VOOGT, supra note 370, at 150 (citations omitted).
378. Dirck Coomhert, Brieven-boek, Letter 99 to Spieghel, quoted in VOOGT, supra
note 370, at 157.
379. Id. at 158-59.
380. VOOGT, supra note 370, at 160 (citing Coomhert, Aengheheven dwangh, in
Wercken, vol. 1, fol. 470A).
381. Id. at 234.
382. Id. at 235.
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religious skepticism or political expediency, but by a deep concern for
the quality of religious life. Their relentless efforts in challenging the
forced imposition of religious uniformity set the stage for the triumph of
religious toleration and freedom in seventeenth century England and
Europe and in eighteenth century America.
IV. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The justifications for religious freedom, first proposed by early
Christian thinkers such as Tertullian and Lactantius and then
rediscovered by sixteenth century tolerationists, are almost wholly
religious in nature: God is sovereign over all things spiritual and
temporal; duty to God is superior to civil obligations; the state has
neither the jurisdiction nor competence to judge spiritual matters;
authentic faith must be voluntary, not coerced; the true Christian displays
love, humility, and forbearance toward those with differing views.
While these were not the only arguments for religious toleration and
freedom during these periods, they were at the forefront of opposition to
the persecuting state.
The next article in this series will explore the connection between
the theological justifications for religious toleration that emerged from
sixteenth and seventeenth century England and Europe and the
development of America's constitutional commitment to religious
freedom. At this point, I want to offer a few brief observations on the
historical inquiry so far. That inquiry calls into question certain
assumptions that can distort our modem discussion about religious
freedom.
A. Origins ofReligious Freedom
One popular view of religious freedom is that it came about
primarily through the efforts of skeptical rationalists who sought to avoid
civil conflict over religious matters. It treats the emergence of religious
freedom as beginning sometime in the seventeenth century and reaching
its pinnacle in the Jeffersonian rationalism of the late eighteenth century,
which produced our constitutional commitment to religious freedom.
The impetus purportedly behind this move was twofold: first, an
emerging skepticism toward the truth claims of religion; and second, a
desire to put an end to civil strife and persecution brought about by
religious conflict. Secular enlightenment rationalists, the argument goes,
were skeptical of religious claims and horrified by religious conflict, so
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they sought to dislodge religious authority from its close connection with
the state.m'
The conventional view overlooks the fact that the ideas and
practices of toleration were available and in use long before the
Enlightenment. The struggle for religious freedom originated with
persons who were deeply religious and thus had a significant stake in the
outcome. The most prominent advocates were not skeptical rationalists;
rather, they were thoughtful and committed Christians who were
concerned with both the purity of the church and the freedom of
individual religious conscience. From Tertullian and Lactantius of late
antiquity, to Sebastian Castellio, Dirk Coornhert, and the radical
Protestants of sixteenth century, to seventeenth-century tolerationists in
England and Europe such as Leonard Busher, William Walwyn, Pierre
Bayle, and John Locke, to early American advocates such as Roger
Williams, William Penn, Elisha Williams, Isaac Backus, John Leland,
and James Madison, the justifications advanced for religious freedom
were predominantly, if not exclusively, based on religious principles.
To understand why religious freedom became such an important
value-important enough to be enshrined in the First Amendment to the
Constitution-we cannot be satisfied with any inquiry that neglects the
deeply religious nature of its pre-constitutional rationales. I do not claim
that skeptical arguments are irrelevant to the development of religious
freedom, nor do I suggest that the subject should be approached
exclusively from the religious perspective. What this series of articles
will show, however, is that religious freedom has not and cannot be
grounded reliably in radical skepticism about religious beliefs.
B. Christianity and Religious Freedom
Modern church-state legal scholarship tends to minimize or reject
the theological roots of religious freedom, at least in part, I think,
because historic Christianity is viewed as fundamentally intolerant. It
often is assumed that the coercion and persecution which came to prevail
in the later fourth and fifth centuries was the natural and predictable
383. For example, Alan Levine, argues that religious skepticism provided the
principal foundation for toleration:
In general, ancient and medieval philosophers did not advocate toleration
because of their attachments to a notion of fixed truth, whether found in nature
or revealed religion. It was only when the crisis of authority became so acute
in the sixteenth century that skepticism arose as a leading philosophical stance
and toleration emerged as a desirable political idea.
Alan Levine, Introduction: The Prehistory of Toleration and Varieties of Skepticism, in
EARLY MODERN SKEPTICISM AND THE ORIGINS OF TOLERATION 9 (Alan Levine, ed., 1999).
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result of Christian exclusivism and in some sense native to Christianity
as a faith system.3 8 4
Historic Christianity is universalistic and exclusivist: it claims
validity for all people in all places at all times and it does not allow for
other ways to God. But it is wrong to assume that exclusivism and
intolerance go hand in hand, and that exclusive Christianity has little, if
anything, important to say about religious freedom. The Christianity
envisioned by Lactantius' theories and Constantine's policy was a
noncoercive and tolerant one which created a reasonably neutral public
square for religion and which encouraged only worship of a single
benevolent creator, a notion very much in keeping with elite pagan
religious and intellectual trends. The persecution that arose after
Constantine's death, Drake explains, was not the inevitable consequence
of Christian theology:
Because in the fourth century emperors became increasingly willing
not only to support Christians but also to suppress traditional religion,
it has been easy to make a prima facie case for inherent intolerance as
the cause of this coercion. Perhaps too easy. Christians did come to
support the use against their enemies of the same force that once had
been used against them, but not without reservations and misgivings.
The shift in this ground is one of the most important consequences of
the fourth century, but it was not inevitable, and "inherent
intolerance" cannot fully account for it, for Christians had an equally
inherent belief that true faith could not be coerced, as Augustine's
need to address this charge shows.385
The depiction of Christianity as an inflexible, one-dimensional,
persecuting faith is more polemic than historical fact. As Drake
suggests, "The coercive Christian as normative is a modern construct-
the worst sort of conceptual anachronism, one that has required every
ounce of scholarly ingenuity to maintain."
The unfounded assumption that Christian exclusivism invariably
leads to intolerance has obscured the fact that the normative Christian
view-as articulated by Tertullian, Lactantius, and others-is that
religious belief and practice should not be dictated by the state, but
should be determined by the individual. Based on their understanding of
God and of authentic religious faith, they held that an imposed or
coerced faith is no faith at all. This does not mean, of course, that within
Christian tradition there is an inevitable and seamless development of
384. For a fuller discussion of this point, see DRAKE, supra note 75, at 20-34, 73-75,
285, 402-05, 451-56 and DIGESER, supra note 49, at 117-18.
385. DRAKE, supra note 75, at 402.
386. Id. at 405.
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religious freedom that leads from the teachings of Jesus to the American
Constitution. Religion in the Christian West has not always been on the
side of religious freedom. Regimes and individuals claiming to be
Christian have unleashed some of the most horrible persecutions in
history. There is no denying that intolerance in the name of Christianity
has caused untold human misery.m But intolerance is not endemic to
Christianity. While historic Christianity departed from its norm for
certain periods, it self-corrected and eventually spawned the modem
notion of religious freedom. This is due in no small part to the resonance
and resiliency of the religious justifications which underlie the normative
view. As I will demonstrate in my next article in this series, these
justifications ultimately prevail in the American experiment.
C. Disconnecting Civil from Spiritual
A third misconception involves the modem idea of separation of
church and state. There are those who argue that the essential
consequence of this separation is that government and politics must be
thoroughly secular.38 8 But this view largely misapprehends the historic
aims for severing the connections between church and state.
As we have seen, the most compelling arguments for religious
freedom drew a line of demarcation-a jurisdictional boundary, if you
will-between spiritual and civil authority. The state in classic antiquity
laid claim to complete control over the order and structure of human
society. Religious and civil authority were unified: pagan gods and
political rulers were one, church and state were indistinguishable, and the
individual's religious allegiance was bound up with his political
allegiance. Political rulers asserted authority over the spiritual decisions
of their subjects, frequently applying the coercive power of civil
government to ensure orthodox belief and practice. Religious toleration,
if it existed at all, was a matter of expediency rather than principle.
The coming of Christianity and the fundamental distinction it drew
between spiritual and civil power brought recognition of a separate
spiritual authority which sought to check the unrestrained power of the
387. The Christian religion does not have a corner on intolerance. Religious
oppression has been characteristic of human societies from the earliest times to the
present. Secular regimes also have committed terrible atrocities in seeking to stamp out
religion. See John Coffey, The Myth of Secular Tolerance, Cambridge Papers, vol. 12,
no. 3 (2003), available at http://www.jubilee-centre.org/document.php?id=40.
388. See, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS
CONSTITUTION: A MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE (2d. ed. 2005); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2193
(2008); but see Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120
(2008) (arguing that "the agnosticism of the Constitution does not entail that governments
operating under the Constitution must be secular").
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state. Christianity severs the individual's religious obligation from his
political obligation, as expressed in Jesus' injunction to "give to Caesar
what is Caesar's, and give to God what is God's.",3 89 It proclaims that a
person's supreme duty is to God, who transcends all temporal and
political orders, thereby placing spiritual matters fundamentally outside
the sphere of civil command. As such, government is neither authorized
nor competent to judge religious truth. This dualism, as we have seen,
reflected an intrinsic difference between these institutions as they were
established by God.
The liberal individualist implications of this distinction were slow to
be recognized and the jurisdictional lines again blurred. For over a
millennium, often with the Christian church's complicity, the state
reasserted its power over spiritual matters, maintaining religious unity by
force and, in the latter centuries, executing heretics and dissenters when
necessary. The horrors of religious persecution provoked Christian
thinkers once again to challenge the assumption that there is an essential
identity between civil and spiritual authority. From the seemingly
endless struggle over who will be the ultimate arbiter of individual and
community life, the inalienable right of religious freedom emerged as a
limit on the power of civil government over spiritual matters.
The reason for disconnecting civil and spiritual was not so much to
confine church and state institutionally to separate spheres of authority-
as modem separationism emphasizes-but to end the state's jurisdiction
over spiritual matters. While the church's exercise of institutional
authority over political matters sometimes was controversial, the
predominant concern voiced by advocates of religious toleration and
freedom was over the state's use of its coercive power to enforce
religious uniformity. This was thought to interfere not just with the
church's authority over its own affairs but, more importantly, with God's
higher authority over individual conscience. Separating the civil from
the spiritual meant limiting the state's power to define or control a
person's relationship to God. This was done to protect religion (and
genuine religious faith), not the state. The concern for the spiritual
welfare of religion weighed more in arguments for religious toleration
and freedom than did any concerns for the secular or political welfare of
the state.
The essential difference between religious and political authority is
the centerpiece of the religious argument for feligious freedom. It is "so
deeply engrained in our political, constitutional, and theological
traditions that it must be accepted as an assumption upon which our
389. Luke 20:25.
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constitutional culture rests."390 Comprehending the nature (and limits) of
the civil-spiritual disconnection is vital to our understanding of what the
Religion Clause means. While modem views of church-state separation
emphasize keeping both church and state apart, with some urging that
religion be excluded altogether from the civil-political sphere, the
historical disconnection of civil from spiritual meant something more
limited-the state was disempowered from defining, controlling, or
enforcing religion. The fuller implications of this disconnection remain a
matter for consideration, but at the very least it suggests that our church-
state debate should carry a different emphasis.
The protections for religious freedom found in the Religion Clause
are rooted in ideas first articulated in the third and fourth centuries and
developed over more than a century long struggle to end the persecuting
state. Rediscovering the historical justifications for religious freedom
can help us gain a renewed appreciation for the importance of religious
principle in fostering religious freedom. Separating the Religion
Clause's result from its underlying rationales, however, will leave us
with a constitutional discourse incapable of meaningfully connecting
with the very ideas that led to nothing less than a massive reordering of
the relationship between church and state.
390. McConnell, The Problem ofSingling Out Religion, supra note 11, at 18.
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